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In Rem Alternatives to Extradition for
Money Laundering
KEITH R. FISHER*

The Lloyds insurance market, jewelry stores, sporting goods
stores, accountants, car dealerships, realtors, art galleries, video
stores, dry cleaners, horse racing, the United States Postal Service,
bars and night clubs, law firms, boat dealers, parking lots, travel
agents-what do these things have in common? Perhaps the title
of this article gives the answer away: All of them have been at least
accused, and in many cases convicted, of being involved in money
laundering.'
This is only the tip of the iceberg, of course. Though often
thought of as the province of financial institutions-principally
banks, but also broker-dealers, thrift institutions, insurance
companies, and so forth-money laundering has become much
more pervasive, infecting not only other more or less financiallyoriented firms (bureaux de change, international money
transmitters, casinos) but also hotels, restaurants, vending machine
operators and a host of retail businesses large and small. Virtually
any business that is cash-intensive will do, and its owner maywittingly or unwittingly-become the cat's paw of unscrupulous
money launderers.

* Associate Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. The author wishes to
express his appreciation to his colleague, Professor Valerie Epps, for her support and
encouragement, as well as for her willingness to share her vast knowledge of public
international law, and, as always, to Dennis J. Lehr, Esq. of Hogan & Hartson for his
peerless insights and sophistication in financial regulatory matters.
1. Money laundering, traditionally defined, is the act of concealing or disguising the
proceeds of criminal activity in order to make them appear to have been legitimately
obtained. Recent developments have shown that money laundering can also involve the
unlawful movement of legitimate funds for the purpose of financing nefarious activityso-called "reverse" money laundering, which has been linked to terrorism.
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Notwithstanding the internationalization of anti-money
laundering enforcement, extradition has not proved to be useful.
This is so for a number of reasons.
Extradition-the
practice of prising the scoundrel from his
2
•
last refuge -is a process of international cooperation that not only
is anachronistic but also poses many legal hurdles. First, any
obligation4 of international extradition is regarded by national
courts as subject to treaty.' The same is true in multinational
judicial bodies, such as the International Court of Justice: Country
B has no obligation to extradite one of its residents to Country A
in the absence of an extradition treaty.6 Second, such treaties are
generally bilateral, making extradition from certain bank secrecy
jurisdictions problematic, since they are unlikely to part too
willingly with the goose that lays the golden egg.7 Third, the crime

2. A more precise definition of extradition is the "surrender by one state or country
to another of an individual accused or convicted of an offense outside its own territory and
within the territorial jurisdiction of the other, which, being competent to try and punish
him, demands the surrender." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 585 (6th ed. 1990).

3. "The present extradition laws belong to the 'world of the horse and buggy and the
steamship, not in the world of commercial jet air transportation and high speed
telecommunications."' GEOFF GILBERT, ASPECTS OF EXTRADITION LAW 1 (1991)
(quoting a letter to Senator Edward Kennedy from former U.S. Attorney General
Benjamin Civiletti).
4. Exceptionally, in some countries, extradition may be provided as a matter of
comity, reciprocity, or further to appropriate domestic legislation. See United States v.
Raushcer, 119 U.S. 407, 411-12 (1886). Obviously, this is purely a matter of national
discretion, not of binding international obligation; see also M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI,
INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION 17 (3d ed. 1996).

5. See, e.g., Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933); In re Extradition of
Howard, 996 F.2d 1320, 1329 (1st Cir. 1993); Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 782 (9th
Cir. 1986); see also Valerie C. Epps, The Validity of the Political Offender Exception in
Extradition:Treaties in Anglo-American Jurisprudence,20 HARV. J. INT'L L. 61, 74 (1979).
Such treaties may be either bilateral or multilateral. BASSIOUNI, supra note 4, at 49.
6. See, e.g., The Lockerbie Case, 1992 ICJ Rep. 24, 31 I.L.M. 662, 666-67 (1992).
7. This is particularly true of so-called offshore financial centers (OFCs) which offer,
in exchange for substantial revenues from those seeking anonymity, essentially tax-free
havens with strong bank secrecy laws; state of the art telecommunications; no exchange
controls; lax or non-existent regulation of banks and corporate entities (little or no
auditing, no annual or other periodic reporting requirements); corporate structures that
can be organized or acquired cheaply, quickly, and anonymously (including the ability to
disguise the ownership of corporations or trusts through the use of nominee directors,
bearer shares, and ready-for-hire trustees); predominant use of a major international
currency (e.g., U.S. dollars, pounds sterling, euros); and no binding international
agreements regarding cooperative law enforcement. When one associates these sorts of
factors with particular jurisdictions, one would normally think of places like Antigua, the
Bahamas, the Cayman Islands, Guernsey, the Netherlands Antilles, Costa Rica, Panama,
and even more out of the way places like the Seychelles, Mauritius, and Vanuatu.
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in question must constitute an "extraditable offense," i.e., one for
which extradition is proper.' Fourth, even if Country B is a party
to an extradition treaty, the underlying offense for which Country
A seeks to prosecute must generally also be characterized as an
offense under the municipal laws of Country B. 9 Nor is an "end
run" possible: Country A cannot seek to extradite someone for
one particular offense, which does satisfy this double criminality
requirement, and then proceed to try him as well for another
offense, which does not. 10 Fifth, even a demand for extradition
that satisfies all of the above criteria may be denied on the grounds
of one or more domestic public policy exceptions," perhaps the
12
most often invoked of which is the "political offense" exception."

However, more mainstream jurisdictions offer many of these benefits, e.g., Liechtenstein,
Austria, Luxembourg, Switzerland, as well as such "romantic" locales as Monaco,
Gibraltar, and Madeira. See generally PETER LILLEY, DIRTY DEALING: THE UNTOLD
TRUTH ABOUT GLOBAL MONEY LAUNDERING 85-104 (2000).

8. In the absence of an extradition treaty, the domicile will look to its customary
practice in determining whether the offense is extraditable. BASSIOUNI, supra note 4, at
393. Where an extradition treaty exists, it will typically adopt one of two methods in
reaching this determination: an essentially enumerative method, where the treaty simply
lists those offenses that are extraditable, or an "eliminative method," which prescribes
minimum punitive measures for offenses under the municipal laws of the demanding
country in order for those offenses to qualify as extraditable (thereby eliminating trivial
offenses from consideration). See generally Barbara Sicalides, Comment, RICO, CCE,
and InternationalExtradition, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 1281, 1293-95 (1989).
9. BASSIOUNI, supra note 4, at 388. This is often referred to as the "double
criminality" factor. Even then, extradition will depend upon the strictness or liberality of
Country B's interpretation of its own laws. A strict interpretation would require that the
criminal conduct be prosecutable with the possibility of conviction under the laws of both
the domicile and the demanding country; a liberal interpretation would require merely
that the conduct be chargeable in both countries as a criminal offense, even if it is not the
same criminal offense. Id. at 390.
10. Country A may prosecute only those crimes specifically listed in the extradition
request. BASSIOUNI, supra note 4, at 429. This is known as the "specialty principle."
Note, however, that U.S. courts have occasionally permitted prosecution for additional
offenses where the extraditing state is willing to waive the specialty principle, e.g., United
States v. Fuentes, 50 F.3d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1995), or where it can be presumed that the
extraditing state would permit it, e.g., United States v. Andonian, 29 F.3d 1432, 1437 (9th
Cir. 1994).
11. Traditionally, extradition has been refused if the offense arose under military law
(e.g., desertion) and not the criminal law generally applicable to the civilian (in the sense
of non-military, not civil law) population. See Dominique Poncet & Paul Gully-Hart,
Extradition: The European Model, in 2 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (M. Cherif
Bassiouni ed. 1987).
12. BASSIOUNI, supra note 4, at 512 (giving as examples treason, sedition, and
espionage). The political offense exception enjoys many formulations. See generally
Christine van den Wijngaert, THE POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION IN EXTRADITION
(1980); Christine E. Cervasio, Extradition and the International Criminal Court: The
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This, like other public policy matters, will be idiosyncratically
construed by the domicile's own courts, though even an
intrinsically political offense (by any nation's standard) might lose
that status if conjoined to a more common crime (e.g., murder,
larceny) or to a particularly heinous international crime (e.g.,
genocide, piracy). 3
From this lengthy (but still not
comprehensive) list of excuses, one is tempted to amend the
modern adaptation of Grotius's famous phrase 4 to aut dedere, aut
judicare, aut tergiversari."
Noteworthy, in the context of anti-money laundering
enforcement, is that there has also been some resistance to

extradition for "fiscal"

offenses. 16

This category comprises

offenses in connection with taxes, duties, and customs, and it is by
no means a foregone conclusion that money laundering would
qualify as a "fiscal" offense (it certainly would not under an
ejusdem generis interpretation, which would likely emphasize a

nexus to revenues).

Nevertheless, there has been a trend away

from this exception."

Future of the Political Offense Doctrine, 11 PACE INT'L L. REV. 419 (1999); Valerie C.
Epps, Abolishing the Political Offense Exception, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 203, 204-06 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed. 1988).
13. BASSIOUNI, supra note 4, at 515-52, 567-73. Cf European Convention on the
Suppression of Terrorism art. 1, opened for signatureJan. 27, 1977, Europ. T.S. No. 90,15
I.L.M. 1272,1272 (1976) (excluding several acts from the concept of political offense).
14. Aut dedere, aut judicare is the modern adaptation; the phrase actually used by
Grotius was aut dedere, aut punire. See Michael Plachta, (Non-) Extradition of Nationals:
A Neverending Story?, 13 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 77, 123-24 (1999), citing Hugo Grotius,
De Jure Belli ac Pacis in THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, bk. II, ch. XXI, at 52628 (James Brown Scott ed. & Francis W. Kelsy trans., 1925).
15. Freely translated: "to hand over, to prosecute, or to shuffle and find excuses."
16. See, e.g., European Convention on Extradition, Paris, 13 Dec. 1957, E.T.S. 24; see
also Bruce Zagaris, Avoiding CriminalLiability in the Conduct of International Business,
21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 749, 833 n.524 (1996) (listing tax-related or other fiscal
offenses among traditional exceptions).
17. Article 2 of the Second Additional Protocol to the European Convention on
Extradition, supra note 16, abolishes the blanket fiscal offense exception. See Gert
Vermeulen & Tom Vander Beken, New Conventions on Extradition and the European
Union: Analysis and Evaluation, 15 DICK. J. INT'L. L. 265, 293-94 (1997). Given the
linkage between money laundering and financing of terrorism, an innovative provision in
the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism
affirmatively prohibits refusal of extradition on the ground that the underlying offense is a
fiscal offense.
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism, GA Res. 54/109 (Dec. 9, 1999), available at http://untreaty.un.org/English/
Terrorism/Conv12.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2003). This convention has not yet entered
into force.
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Even more significant, perhaps, than any of these technical
legal factors, extradition is likely to be unavailable or unavailing,
because the person who is prosecutable for the money laundering
offense is rarely the person law enforcement really wants, the one
at the top of the pyramid of unlawful activity; he is typically
insulated from the nitty gritty of criminal activity, and largely
operates with impunity, secure in the knowledge that he faces little
risk of arrest or prosecution. Rather, the prosecutable person is
likely to be someone farther down the criminal food chain,
someone who can be sacrificed, if need be, without doing more
than inconveniencing the criminal enterprise, and then only
slightly. To visit anything more than inconvenience on a criminal
enterprise, one must cause it to sacrifice more than a pawn.
If the in personam method of bringing the perpetrators to
justice faces too many practical difficulties, then it makes sense to
bring justice to the perpetrators via an in rem method. This is the
logic behind asset forfeiture. By forcing the sacrifice of the
laundered proceeds themselves, law enforcement is able to deal a
genuine blow to the criminal enterprise.
For activity as global as money laundering, however, effective
asset forfeiture regimes must be international in their sweep.
Otherwise, criminal enterprises may easily defeat municipal
forfeiture laws by the simple expedient of transferring their illgotten gains to another jurisdiction. Modern technology allows
this to be done from the privacy of one's dwelling with the click of
a mouse or the touch of a keyboard. Indeed, technological
advances have been much more helpful to money launderers than
to law enforcement, not only because of the increased ease and
speed of global money transfers and the anonymity conferred by
sophisticated encryption techniques,"' but also because of the
creation of new modalities of laundering, as shown in the next
section.
Part I of this article will outline, in broad terms, the scope of
the problem posed by global money laundering. Part II will review
the development of international asset forfeiture regimes,
including an assessment of some of their current strengths and
weaknesses. Finally, Part III will discuss some ideas for dealing
with the more obvious weaknesses.

18. See generally Andres Rueda, The Implications of Strong Encryption Technology
on Money Laundering, 12 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1 (2001).
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I. THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
Sadly, the size and sophistication of organized crime bears
little resemblance to what one would infer from the louche
characters in popular media portrayals, such as the cable television
series The Sopranos, but great resemblance to efficiently managed
multinational corporations. 19 Among the most commonly
encountered denizens of the underground money laundering world
are the so-called "Big Five"2 -comprising the Colombian drug
cartels, the Italian Mafia, the Russian "Mafiya", 2' the Chinese
Triads, and the Japanese Yakuza-as well as the Mexican drug
cartels and various Mediterranean or Middle Eastern drug gangs
(Kurds, Turks, Cypriots, etc.), terrorist groups (chiefly Islamic but
others as well), Nigerian crime syndicates, and various other
random outlaws (e.g., Hell's Angels in Canada).22 Of all these
groups, the Colombians-though by no means the largest or the
most dangerous worldwide-have perhaps the most sophisticated,
23
corporate-type structure, of particular concern to the United
States as the Colombians' protean distribution system manages to
nullify even significant law enforcement successes.24
Worse yet, even as law enforcement authorities pursue
international cooperation, these multinational organized criminal

19. See JOHN KERRY, THE NEW WAR: THE WEB OF CRIME THAT THREATENS
AMERICA'S SECURITY 19 (1997). The author of this book, the junior senator from

Massachusetts, has been active in congressional investigations of money laundering issues,
including the BCCI scandal.
20. Id. at 21.
21. "Mafiya" is so spelled in order to distinguish the Russian variety from the Italian,
following the usage in STEPHEN HANDELMAN, COMRADE CRIMINAL 21-22 (1995). The
former is, despite its appellation, not limited to the current Russian Republic, of course,
but spans the entirety of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. See Russian
Organized Crime in the United States: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on
Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1996) (remarks of Senator Roth).
22. LILLEY, supra note 7, at 18-23.
23. See Problems and Dangers Posed by Organized Transnational Crime in the
Various Regions of the World, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL
ORGANIZED CRIME 12 (Phil Williams & Ernest U. Savona eds., 1996).

24. Some popular press accounts have chronicled the development of Caribbean
gateways to the U.S. market when law enforcement coups threatened to pinch the
Mexican distribution pipeline. See Douglas Farah & Serge Kovaleski, Cartels Make
Puerto Rico a Major Gateway to the U.S., WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 1988, at Al; Serge
Kovaleski, Cartels 'Buying' Haiti; Corruption is Widespread; Drug-Related Corruption
Epidemic, id. at A22.
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enterprises have themselves made common cause in a number of
instances. As Senator Kerry points out:
[C]rime today is not simply random or local; more often it is
purposeful and global. The vast poppy fields in eastern Turkey
are linked to the heroin dealer in downtown Detroit; the banker
laundering drug money in Vienna is in league with the thriving
cocaine refineries in Colombia. The men of the Chinese triads
who control gambling and extortion in San Francisco's
Chinatown work the same network as the Singapore gang that
turns out millions of fake credit cards. The contract hit man
who flies in from Moscow to kill an uncooperative store owner
in New York, on behalf of the Organizatsiya, gets his fake
papers by supplying the Sicilian Mafia with Soviet Army surplus
ground-to-air missiles to smuggle into the Balkans to supply the
Bosnian Serbs with the firepower to take on U.N. security
forces."
Relatively recent estimates of the extent of global money
laundering annually vary, ranging from U.S. $500-800 billion 26 to

U.S. $1 trillion.27 (These estimates are converted to U.S. dollars
for convenience, but include, of course, laundering in all
currencies). According to the International Monetary Fund, this
amounts to anywhere from 2% to 5% of the world's gross
domestic product. 28 The General Accounting Office has estimated
that, in U.S. dollar-denominated assets alone, $100-300 billion are

25. KERRY, supra note 19, at 24. Indeed, the increased level of cooperation among
the Big Five in relation to their criminal enterprises-a kind of "honor among thieves" to

the nth power-parallels that of the industrialized countries in fields such as law
enforcement and economic (e.g., banking and securities) regulation. Reports of a
convocation in France of "businessmen" from the Russian republic, Japan, Italy,
Colombia, and Hong Kong have it that the discussion was devoted to market allocation:

"carving up western Europe for drugs, prostitution, smuggling and extortion rackets." See
Andrew Alderson & Carey Scott, Crime Kings Meet to Carve Up Europe, SUN. TIMES,
Mar. 29, 1988.
26. See Money Laundering: Hearing Before the Comm. on Banking and Financial
Services, 106th Cong., 2d Sess. 210 (2000) [hereinafter "2000 LAUNDERING HEARINGS"]

(remarks of Sen. Charles E. Schumer).
27. See Criminal Money Laundering and Illegal Flight Capitak Hearings Before the
U.S. House of Representatives Comm. on Banking and FinancialServices, 106th Cong., 2d
Sess. 214, 217 (2000) (testimony of Dr. Raymond Baker, Senior Fellow, Brookings

Institution).
28. 2000 LAUNDERING HEARINGS, supra note 26, at 67-68 (testimony of Deputy
Secretary of the Treasury Stuart Eizenstat).
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laundered each year.29 Ominously, all of these estimates are likely
to be understated, as they fail to take into account weaPons of
mass destruction (WMD) and terrorist dollar flow amounts.
"Cleanliness is next to Godliness," the old adage goes, but
laundering dirty money has rather the opposite tendency:
Money laundering has devastating social consequences and is a
threat to national security because money laundering provides
the fuel for drug dealers, terrorists, arms dealers, and other
criminals to operate and expand their criminal enterprises. In
doing so, criminals manipulate financial systems in the United
States and abroad. Unchecked, money laundering can erode
the integrity of a nation's financial institutions. Due to the high
integration of capital markets, money laundering can also
negatively affect national and global interest rates as launderers
reinvest funds where their schemes are less likely to be detected
rather than where rates of return are higher because of sound
economic principles. Organized financial crime is assuming an
increasingly significant role that threatens the safety and
security of peoples, states, and democratic institutions.
Moreover, our ability to conduct foreign policy and to promote
our economic security and prosperity is hindered by these
threats to our democratic and free-market partners.3'

Similar sentiments about the deleterious effects upon society have
been expressed by the Office of the U.N. Secretary General, 32 by

29. U.S. General Accounting Office, Money Laundering:FinCEN's Law Enforcement
Support Role Is Evolving, GAO/GGD-98-117 at 1 (June 19, 1998).
30. The linkage of financial crime to terrorist activities has led the Treasury
Department recently to establish a new unit, known as the Executive Office for Terrorist
Financing and Financial Crimes, that will oversee the Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network bureau (FinCEN) and the Office of Foreign Asset Controls. See Glenn R.
Simpson, New Treasury Office to Focus on Terror Financing,WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 2003, at
A14. The office is charged with developing and implementing U.S. government strategies
to combat terrorist financing, developing and implementing the National Money
Laundering Strategy and similar initiatives, participating in Treasury's evolving policies
and regulations in support of the USA PATRIOT Act, and representing the United States
at focused international bodies dedicated to fighting terrorist financing and financial
crime. See infra note 50; see also Derrick Cain, Homeland Security: Treasury Announces
New Executive Office to Lead Efforts Against Terrorist Financing, 80 BANKING REP.
(BNA) 415 (Mar. 10, 2003).

31. U.S.

DEP'T

OF

STATE,

BUREAU

FOR

INT'L

NARCOTICS

AND

LAW

ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT.

1997, at 2 (Mar. 1998).
32. See generally Secretary-General of the United Nations, Note, Strengthening
Existing International Cooperation in Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Including
Technical Cooperation in Developing Countries, with Special Emphasis on Combating
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economic studies performed by staff at the International Monetary
Fund, 33 and by recent scholarship.34
Money laundering allows criminals to infuse their ill-gotten
money into the stream of commerce, in the process not only
tainting with corruption a variety of financial institutions and the
nation's money supply but also assisting criminals to achieve
economic power that can be used to subvert other segments of the
economy. By allowing past criminality to go undetected, by
providing the criminal with the means to enjoy the fruits of that
criminality, and by furnishing the wherewithal to finance even
greater and, particularly in the case of terrorist financing, more
sinister criminal schemes in the future, money laundering actually
promotes continuous (and continuously growing) criminal
enterprises.
Among the first nations to recognize the threat posed by
money laundering was the United States. In an effort to deter
routine deposits of "shopping-bagfuls" (or, indeed, truckfuls) of
cash into the banking system, Congress imposed currency
reporting requirements on banks and other financial institutions.
Pursuant to what is commonly referred to as the Bank Secrecy
Act,35 financial institutions were required to file a report with the

Organized Crime, Addendum: Money Laundering and Associated Issues: the Need for
InternationalCooperation, E/CN.15/1992/4/ Add.5 (1992).
33. See, e.g., Vito Tanzi, International Monetary Fund Working Paper 96/55, Money
Laundering and the InternationalFinancialSystem (1996) (arguing that money laundering
distributes tainted money around the world not on the basis of economically efficient uses,
or even expected rates of return, but on the basis of ease of avoiding governmental
controls, thereby distorting international allocation of resources): Peter Quirk,
International Monetary Fund Working Paper 96/66, Macroeconomic Implications of
Money Laundering (1996) (arguing that money laundering undermines the governance of
banks and corrupts bankers, leading to non-market behavior that increases safety and
soundness risks, and may also threaten to corrupt regulators, thereby reducing the efficacy
of bank supervision).
34. See, e.g., Peter Alldridge, The Moral Limits of the Crime of Money Laundering, 5
BUFF. CRIM. L.R. 279, 307, nn. 81-82 (2001) (citing Donato Masciandaro, Money
Laundering: The Economics of Regulation, 7 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 225 (1999) (asserting
increasingly pollutant effect of money laundering-introduction of tainted money into the
system spreads the taint to other funds)); Donato Masciandaro, The Economics of Money
Laundering (L'Economia del Riciclaggio e Della PoliticaAntiriciclaggio), LIV GIORNALE
DEGLI ECONOMISTI E ANNALI DI ECONOMIA 211 (1995) (simile); Gianandrea Goisis,
Economic Impact of Rules Against Money Laundering, 43 RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI
SCIENZE ECONOMICHE E COMMERCIALI 303 (1996) (simile).

35. Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84
Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified as amended in sections of 12, 18, and 31 U.S.C.) [hereinafter
referred to as the "BSA"].
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government (initially, with the Internal Revenue Service) on any
cash transaction in excess of $10,000-thereby creating the sort of
paper trail that criminals wallowing in the anonymity of cash
businesses go to great lengths to avoid.
Seek to avoid it they did-first, by "smurfing" -dividing cash
deposits into amounts under $10,000 and dispatching low-level
employees to make deposits in multiple branches of multiple
financial institutions; second, by availing themselves of cash
substitutes such as postal money orders and "smurfing" those (in
the process making the U.S. Postal Service one of the largest
money launderers in the world, at least until computerized systems
were developed to monitor and counter this technique); and third,
by commingling "dirty" money with income from legitimate
businesses and engaging in transactions in the names of third
parties. This not only muddies the waters for investigators but also
allows the taint of laundered money to infect these legitimate
businesses and suborn other criminal misconduct.37
To address these problems, Congress, more than 15 years
after the BSA's enactment, passed the Money Laundering Control
Act of 1986,38 this time making the act of money laundering itself a
crime. 39 Whenever a transaction in excess of $10,000 implicates a
financial institution and involves property derived from anything
on a long list of specified unlawful activities," stiff civil and
criminal sanctions may be imposed, including fines, imprisonment,
and forfeiture.4 '

36.

The BSA established the system of reporting requirements known as Currency

Transaction Reports (CTR's), and was aimed not at money laundering per se but at
facilitating not only criminal investigations but also civil tax and financial regulatory

investigations by creating a paper trail for currency transactions in excess of the statutory
figure of $10,000. See 31 U.S.C. § 5311 et seq.
37. See, e.g., LILLEY, supra note 7, at 30-34, 72-76, 80-83.
38. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12, 18, and 31 U.S.C.) [hereinafter the "MLCA"].
39. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-57. The MLCA was the first specific criminalization of
money laundering under U.S. law, including aiding and abetting money laundering,
knowingly (or by ostrich-like unwillingness to see the truth) engaging in transactions

involving $10,000 or more worth of property derived from criminal activity, and
structuring transactions in order to avoid BSA reporting requirements.

40. E.g., narcotics trafficking, murder, kidnaping, and extortion, and extending
further to cover other offenses such as espionage, bribery of foreign officials, and even
food stamp fraud. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7).
41. Where laundered funds have been commingled with "clean" money, courts are
often willing to allow forfeiture of the latter, on the ground that they facilitated money
laundering by obscuring the source of criminal proceeds. See, e.g., United States v.
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These measures were reasonably effective at first and resulted
in many successful prosecutions for money laundering and the
confiscation of hundreds of millions of dollars in laundered funds.
Nonetheless criminals, ever adaptive, found new ways to beat the
system.4 The ingenuity of the criminal class in transporting large
amounts of cash ranged from the low-tech avoidance of the
banking system altogether by old-fashioned bulk cash smugglingusing couriers to move large bundles of currency in boxes,
suitcases, and concealed compartments in vehicles and shipped
increasingly
and
complex,
increasingly
appliances - to
international methods of laundering, for example by sending
money abroad through a complex series of transactions involving
shell corporations and offshore banks operating in countries
without effective currency reporting or other money laundering
laws.
.In the United States alone, then, anti-money laundering has
been the object of several legislative efforts spanning a period of
over thirty years, with enactments becoming increasingly frequent
during the last fifteen. After the BSA and the MLCA came, in
fairly rapid succession, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 44 Section

Contents of Account Numbers 208-06070 and 208-06068-1-2, 847 F. Supp. 329, 335
(S.D.N.Y. 1994).
42. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 981-986.
43. This is hardly a recent development: Hawala and other Asian systems of
"underground banking" have been practiced for centuries. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF
THE

TREASURY,

FINANCIAL

CRIMES

ENFORCEMENT

NETWORK,

&

INTERPOL/FOPAC, THE HAWALA ALTERNATIVE REMITTANCE SYSTEM AND ITS
ROLE IN MONEY LAUNDERING.

44. Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered

sections of the U.S. Code). The Anti-Drug Abuse Act, inter alia, enhanced civil and
criminal penalties for money laundering offenses and BSA violations and established the
in rem remedy of forfeiture of real or personal property related to any such infractions.
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2532 of the Crime Control Act of 1990, 4' and the Annunzio-Wylie
Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1992.46
Even as U.S. money launderers perfected their techniques of
global transfer, foreign criminals discovered the ease with which
they can place the proceeds of their overseas crimes in the United
States. The Bank of New York47 and Citibank/Raul Salinas-k
45. Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 2532, 104 Stat. 4789, 4880 (1990) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §
1818(v)). The Comprehensive Thrift and Bank Fraud Prosecution and Taxpayer
Recovery Act constitutes Title XXV of the Crime Control Act of 1990. Section 2532
thereof authorizes foreign investigations by federal bank regulators, requests for
assistance from foreign banking authorities, and providing them in turn with assistance for
their U.S. investigations. Cf. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvements Act
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 206, 105 Stat. 2236, 2294 (1991) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §
3109) (authorizing disclosure of information to foreign banking supervisors where not
prejudicial to the interests of the United States and, where necessary, with confidentiality
undertakings).
46. See Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, tit. xv, Pub. L. No. 102550, 106 Stat. 3672, 4044 (1992) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 31
U.S.C.) [hereinafter Annunzio-Wylie].
Targeted primarily at regulated financial
institutions, Annunzio-Wylie further enhanced penalties for violations of the anti-money
laundering statutes, including (in the case of depository institutions) termination of
deposit insurance or involuntary conservatorship, as well as removal and prohibition
orders against any institution-affiliated party (as defined in § 8(u) of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1813(u)) complicit in such violations. The statute also granted
each financial institution immunity from civil liability to any customer (a so-called "safe
harbor") as a result of the institution's compliance with reporting obligations to, or
cooperation with investigative efforts by, the government, but created an additional
criminal offense for "tipping off" any customer about a pending grand jury investigation
or subpoena.
47. Lucy Edwards (ne6 Lyudmilla Pritzker), a Russian-born Bank of New York
executive who supervised Eastern European accounts, and her husband, Peter Berlin,
pleaded guilty to laundering approximately $7 billion in funds originating in Russia and
transferred through Bank of New York accounts to third parties all over the world from
1996 to 1999. See, e.g., Raymond Bonner & Timothy L. O'Brien, Guilty Pleas Seen in the
Laundering of Russian Money, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2000, at Al: Liz Moyer, Couple Plead
Guilty in $ 7B Laundering Case at Bank of N. Y., AM. BANKER, Feb. 17, 2000, at 18
(noting also that during this time, Edwards and Berlin transferred funds from two Russian
banks, Depozitarno-Kliringovy Bank and Commercial Bank Flamingo, through Bank of
New York and other international banks).
48. Raul Salinas, brother of the former President of Mexico, had extensive banking
relationships with Citibank in New York. Although Raul never earned more than a salary
of $190,000, he deposited some $100 million with Citibank. According to the Wall Street
Journal,Citibank's handling of the matter not only represented an utter abdication of its
obligations to report suspicious transactions but also, when an internal investigation was
belatedly begun, was conducted by senior bank officials in a manner that blocked the
bank's top money laundering compliance officer from participation. See Laurie Hays,
Citibank 'Cop' Was Kept Off Salinas Probe, WALL ST. J., June 11, 1996, at A3 (noting also

that Citibank moves U.S. $98 trillion through ninety-seven countries each year); Laurie
Hays, U.S. Is Pressing Probe of How Citibank Handled $100 Million for Raul Salinas,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 1996, at A4; see also Anthony DePalma & Peter Truell, A Mexican
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scandals revealed millions of dollars derived from organized crime
in Russia and Mexican governmental corruption, respectively,
being placed in major banks in New York. Terrorist funds from
the Hamas organization in the Middle East were discovered in
Chicago, as were links to Osama bin Laden.49
Manifestly, then, the rather large documentation and
regulatory compliance burden that has been imposed under U.S.
law upon depository institutions has not been effective at
preventing criminals from continuing to use those institutions to
launder vast sums of money. Nor are depository institutions the
only regulated enterprises that are vulnerable to such use. Quite
obviously, securities brokers and dealers, commodities brokers,
and investment companies are also likely targets for the
unscrupulous. These have become subject to ever-more-exacting
anti-money laundering regulation, ° but there remain loopholes
large enough to drive through a large truckload of dirty money.

Mover and Shaker Got the Red Carpet at Citibank, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1996, at Al; U.S.
Government Accounting Office, Private Banking: Raul Salinas, Citibank, and Alleged
Money Laundering, GAO/OSI 99-1 (Oct. 1998).
49. See, e.g., Robert Manor & Laurie Cohen, Chicago Link Emerges as U.S. Freezes
More Assets, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 13, 2001, at 1; Laurie Cohen, Robert Manor & Stephen
Franklin, Area Group Linked to Hamas, U.S. Says; Documents Allege Role as Terrorists'
Propaganda Arm, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 16, 2001, at 1; Jeff Gerth & Judith Miller, A Nation
Challenged: On the List- Philanthropist, or Fount of Funds for Terrorists?, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 13, 2001, at B3; Philip Shenon, A Nation Challenged: The Money Trail- U.S. MuslimBased Charity Raided by NATO in Kosovo, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17,2001, at B6.
50. See, e.g., Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 [hereinafter referred to as
"USA PATRIOT Act"], Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 356, 115 Stat. 272, 324 (2001) (requiring
the Secretary of the Treasury, after consultation with the SEC and the Federal Reserve
Board, to promulgate no later than January 1, 2002 proposed regulations (and final
regulations no later than July 1, 2002) requiring registered broker-dealers to submit
suspicious activity reports (SARs) pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)). For the text of the
final regulations, see Dept. of Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
(FinCEN), Amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act Regulations-Requirement that Brokers
or Dealers in Securities Report Suspicious Transactions, 67 Fed. Reg. 44,048 (July 1, 2002)
(codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 103). Subsequent Treasury Department regulations have applied
SAR requirements to casinos and card clubs, 67 Fed. Reg. 60,722 (Sept. 26, 2002),
insurance companies, 67 Fed. Reg. 64,067 (Oct. 17, 2002), currency dealers, 67 Fed. Reg.
64,075 (Oct. 17, 2002), and mutual funds, 68 Fed. Reg. 2,716 (Jan. 21, 2003); see also
Securities and Exchange Commission, Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing and
Order Granting Accelerated Approval of Proposed Rule Change by the Chicago Board
Options Exchange, Inc. To Establish CBOE Rule 4.20 Requiring Each Member and
Member Organization To Develop and Implement an Anti-Money Laundering Compliance
Program, 67 Fed. Reg. 58,665 (Sept. 17, 2002).
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For example, as recently as 2001, responding to a request
from Senator Carl Levin, Ranking Member of the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs, the General Accounting Office issued an
interim report on the impact of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of
199951 on oversight of the securities industry's compliance with
anti-money laundering requirements. Prior to GLEBA, U.S. bank
regulators, as part of their supervisory responsibilities with respect
to depository institutions and their holding companies, routinely
examined broker-dealers
affiliated with such depository
institutions or holding companies52 for compliance with, inter alia,
obligations to make CTR and suspicious activity report (SAR)
filings. GLEBA, however, inaugurated a regime of "functional
regulation,"53 whereby the bank regulators lost jurisdiction to
oversee those broker-dealers, which became the sole responsibility
of the SEC. 54 Since GLEBA's enactment in 1999, then, the GAO
51. Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered provisions of 12
and 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter referred to as "GLEBA"]. In brief, GLEBA effected
sweeping changes to several regulatory regimes, among which was the elimination of
prohibitions against the combination of banking, securities, and insurance under a single
holding company umbrella. For more detailed information on GLEBA, see generally
Keith R. Fisher, Orphan of Invention: Why the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Was
Unnecessary, 80 ORE. L. REV. 1301, 1396-1421 (2002); PATRICIA A. MCCOY (ED.),
FINANCIAL MODERNIZATION AFTER GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY (2002).
52. Notwithstanding the partial separation of commercial and investment banking
wrought by the Glass-Steagall Act, bank holding companies were permitted to have
broker-dealer subsidiaries (so-called "Section 20 subsidiaries") engaged in underwriting
and dealing, to a limited extent, in all types of securities, and banks and thrift institutions
likewise were permitted to engage (either directly or through subsidiaries, depending upon
the nature of the activity) in a variety of securities activities. For a more detailed
treatment of bank securities activities in the pre-GLEBA environment, see, e.g., Keith R.
Fisher, Reweaving the Safety Net: Bank Diversification into Securities and Insurance
Activities, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123,147-89 (1992).
53. This is an approach to financial regulation predicated on the belief that similar
activities should be regulated by the same regulator regardless of where those activities
may be located. Prior to GLEBA, bank securities activities were not subject to regulation
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) because of statutory exemptions
contained in the federal securities laws. For example, Sections 3(a)(4) and 3(a)(5) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 excluded banks from the definitions of "broker" and
"dealer," respectively. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(4), (5) (repealed by GLEBA in 1999). Under
functional regulation, by contrast, in whatever nook or cranny of a financial holding
company structure an activity may be housed or conducted, it will be subject, if it is a
securities activity, to regulation by the SEC.
54. See GLEBA §§ 201-202, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)-(5) (West Supp. 2002). The same
is true for bank investment advisory activities (other than trust department activities), as
GLEBA eliminated bank exemptions from the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15
U.S.C. § 80a-1 et seq., and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,15 U.S.C. § 80b-1, etseq.
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found, "the broker-dealer subsidiaries of depository institutions
and their holding companies, which are still subject to banking
SAR rules, are not being examined for compliance...
[therewith]." 55 Nor was the slack being taken up by the SEC,
which disavowed any "specifically assigned authority to enforce
the [banking] rules and related requirements" until such time as
the Treasury Department issued a rule specific to the securities
industry.56 It is shocking, to say the least, that such a gaping
chasm-virtually an engraved invitation to money laundering at
broker-dealers representing just short of half of the assets of New
York Stock Exchange firms doing business with the public-could
have slipped through the cracks not just temporarily but remained
so for an extended period while federal regulators stood wringing
their hands over a jurisdictional lacuna but did nothing to remedy
it. Quis custodet custodes ipsos?

Even as the Keystone Cops mottle the financial regulatory
landscape with anti-money laundering impedimenta strewn hither
and yon, the criminals effortlessly jump over these low hurdles or
else nimbly dance around them. They use front companiestypically cash-intensive businesses that they've acquired either
"legitimately" or through extortion and violence-mixing and
diluting illegal with legal revenues to place money in the financial
system without raising any eyebrows. Or they employ methods
used for decades to conceal illegal flight capital-falsification of
international trade prices, such as by overpricing imports and
underpricing exports:
For example, a business manager or owner in Venezuela
negotiates to purchase machinery from a U.S. manufacturer.
He requests that the $1 million price be increased by 10 percent
55. U.S. General Accounting Office, Money Laundering: Oversight of Suspicious
Activity Reporting at Bank-Affiliated Broker-Dealers, GAO-01-474, at 8 (Mar. 2001).

According to the Federal Reserve using data as of year-end 1999, those broker-dealer
affiliates "accounted for 44% of the assets represented by New York Stock Exchange
Members doing business with the public." U.S. General Accounting Office, Money
Laundering: Oversight of Suspicious Activity Reporting at Bank-Affiliated Broker-Dealers,
GAO-01-474, at 4 (Mar. 2001).
56. Id. at 11.
This deplorable state of affairs was finally remedied with the
promulgation of regulations by the Treasury Department pursuant to congressional
mandate in Section 356 of the USA PATRIOT Act-see supra note 50-though those
regulations vouchsafed primary examination and enforcement authority not to the SEC
but to FinCEN, with the added requirement that the requisite reports also be made
available by broker-dealers to a self-regulatory organization registered with the SEC that
examines the broker-dealer for compliance. 31 C.F.R. § 103.19(g) (2002).
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so that upon payment of $1.1 million for the machinery the
extra $100,000 is to be deposited into his private bank account
in the United States.... Similarly, an exporter of art works in
Ukraine can sell her paintings, sculptures, and icons to a West
European dealer for, say, 50 percent less than their negotiated
value, with the understanding that when payment is made the
extra 50 percent will be deposited into her German bank
account.... There are many other ways the same end is
accomplished, including paying for imports and exports that do
not exist or for services never rendered, cross trading through
cooperative brokers who eventually lose one leg of the deal,
transferring business and property ownerships offshore without
repatriating full compensation, and carefully constructing bank
transfers of untaxed funds.... Bankers... approach foreigners
to make arrangements for the movement of flight capital,
advising how other customers have done it, providing
introductions to overseas traders, offering to assist with
necessary credits and documentation and ultimately managing
the
accumulating
funds
in their private
banking
departments.... [I]n New Delhi recently, a Swiss banker was

calling on potential customers offering to set up private
accounts in her bank, even though it is against the law for
Indians to have such accounts out of the country.57
Then there are the underground bankers, international funds
transmitters such as those involved in the notorious Colombian
Black Market Peso Exchange 8 and the money launderer du jour,
Hawala. Tracing its ancient lineage to Asia, Hawala has evolved
into a common method of money transmission throughout the
Third World, including much of the Middle East. In contrast to

57. Raymond W. Baker, The Biggest Loophole in the Free-MarketSystem, WASH. 0.
29, 33-34 (Autumn 1999).
58. Having evolved as a means of facilitating flight capital, the black market peso
exchange was an ideal vehicle for Colombian drug lords to use in reverse, converting
dollar proceeds of U.S. drug sales into pesos at home. The money transmitter would make
the currency exchange considerably below the official exchange rate, pocketing the
difference as his profit, but the drug lords didn't care, given the huge profits from drug
trafficking. The transmitter would take the risk of smurfing the dollars into the U.S.
financial system. Sometimes these dollars could then be wired to personal accounts or
used to purchase good and services that could then be exported from the U.S. to Colombia
and resold for pesos. For more detailed discussion of the Colombian black market peso
exchange, see, e.g., William F. Bruton, Money Laundering: Is It Now a Corporate
Problem?, 17 DICK. J. INT'L L. 437, 438-48 (1999); Luz Estella Nagle, U.S. Mutual
Assistance to Colombia: Vague Promises and Diminishing Returns, 23 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 1235, 1263-66 (2000).
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modern banking operations, which operate more on the basis of
negotiable instruments and government guarantees (e.g., deposit
insurance), Hawala is a system dependent upon trust reposed in
the middleman. One who wishes to send the money abroad takes
it to the middleman, the Hawaladar, in exchange for some sort of
receipt; the Hawaladar then notifies his contact in the desired
destination country, another Hawaladar, and the latter will make
the original amount of money, less a commission, available to a
designated recipient (analogous to a "payee") at the other end. 9
Criminal enterprises, sometimes using mainstream financial
institutions, learned to exploit yet another layer of anonymity
through the use of correspondent accounts. There, launderers
deposit tainted funds into dollar-denominated accounts at foreign
banks that, in turn, deposit those funds in correspondent accounts
maintained in their own names at major U.S. financial institutions.
Such correspondent accounts have numerous, legitimate business
purposes in the world of commercial banking, yet, as with many
other business practices, they can be exploited by the
unscrupulous.
Again, unlike the usual deposit account, the account holder in
a correspondent account (the person who has control over the
funds) is the foreign bank. Since money is fungible, the funds
deposited in the correspondent account may well represent the
amount of the criminal proceeds, but nominally the owner of the
account is the foreign bank, not the criminal depositor (or his
money launderer). The latter remains off-shore, beyond the reach
of U.S. law enforcement, but able at any time to withdraw the
funds indirectly from the U.S. correspondent by instructions to the
foreign bank. In this way, the tainted money has been safely
invested in the United States in the name of the foreign bank and,
of course, successfully "placed" in the life cycle of laundering

59. There need be no physical transfer of currency; everything can readily be done by
book entries as long as the movement of funds is two-way. The books are balanced by
means of future money transfers or exchanges of goods between the two Hawaladars. No
records of the transaction are available for the prying eyes of law enforcement. In fact, no
physical money has ever left the original country, nor has any physical money ever come
into the destination country, but the value has been transferred between the two
Hawaladars. For descriptions of Hawala, see, e.g., James J. Savage, Executive Use of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act - Evolution through the Terrorist and
Taliban Sanctions, 10 CURRENTS INT'L TRADE L.J. 28, 38-39 (2001); Douglas Frantz,
Ancient Secret System Moves Money Globally, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2001, at B5.

426

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 25:409

money.i Subsequent instructions to the foreign bank can result in
the tainted money being wired elsewhere, domestically or
internationally, or used to acquire goods that in turn can be
exported for resale, thereby successfully completing the laundering
process.
Under prior law, innocent owners of criminal proceeds were
not subject to confiscation.6 ' Even assuming that law enforcement
could identify the funds in the correspondent account as derived
from proceeds of a specific crime, the funds were taboo because
the law regarded the foreign bank as the innocent owner.
Gradually, it became clear that correspondent accounts
represented a serious chink in the U.S. anti-money laundering
armor. 62
Further legislation to respond to these and other
developments is unfailingly predictable and ever necessary. Yet,
the proposed (but not ultimately enacted) Money Laundering
Deterrence Act of 1998,63 and even the modestly successful
International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-terrorist

60. "Placement" is the first of three stages of money laundering and consists of
arranging for the tainted funds to enter the financial system, either through deposit
directly into a bank account or through the purchase of financial instruments (e.g., money
orders) that are then collected and deposited into accounts elsewhere. The second stage is
"layering," during which the funds are transmitted and scattered through a series of
accounts at a variety of financial institutions in diverse geographic locations. The third
and final state, "integration," involves the reentry of the funds into the financial system or
the economy as "legitimate" funds, suitable for investment or purchase of assets. See
generally FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, BASIC FACTS
ABOUT MONEY LAUNDERING, How IS MONEY LAUNDERED?, available at
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/Mlaundering-en.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 983(d).
62. See MINORITY STAFF OF THE U.S. SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INVESTIGATIONS, REPORT ON CORRESPONDENT BANKING: A GATEWAY TO MONEY

LAUNDERING (Feb. 5, 2001) (detailing instances of money laundering via correspondent

accounts), reprinted in Role of U.S. Correspondent Banking in International Money
Laundering: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong., 1st Sess., v.1, 273-696 (Comm. Print
2001),
available
at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_senatehearings&docid=f:71166.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
63. H.R. 4005, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998). The proposed legislation, which passed
the House but died in the Senate, recognized the extent of organized crime's infiltration of
financial and commercial enterprises, would have broadened the investigative power of
the government, enhanced safe harbor protections considerably, including for accountants
and self-regulatory organizations (as defined by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) who
filed SARs), and required the promulgation of know-your customer (KYC) regulations by
the Treasury Department and the bank regulatory agencies.
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Financing Act of 20016' have not kept pace with criminal ingenuity.
The proliferation and increasing sophistication of global money
laundering has confounded law enforcement authorities. Playing
"catch up" may be an occupational hazard for them, but the
realization that, far from gaining on their adversaries, they are
falling farther and farther behind, gives rise to considerable
frustration. That frustration is compounded when, even after a
successful money-laundering investigation has been concluded,
existing legal regimes often remain inadequate not only to bring
perpetrators domiciled in another country to justice but to
confiscate enough money to do more than inconvenience criminal
enterprises.
II. EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL IN REM REGIMES
A. TraditionalIn Rem Approaches

Of the well-established criminal offenses that are typically
connected with, and predicates for, money laundering-offenses
such as arms trafficking, fraud, terrorism, and narcotics
trafficking-the latter certainly takes pride of place in terms of
both dollar volume and the attention it has received from law
enforcement.
Several multilateral and bilateral treaties are
intended to foster international cooperation in narcotics
enforcement.
The most important of these international
64. Pub. L. No. 107-56, tit. iii, 115 Stat. 272, 296 (2001) [hereinafter referred to as
"IMLAAFA"]. For a suggestion of a substitute, Tolkienesque acronym (IMLADRIS),
see Keith R. Fisher, Foreword: InternationalBanking at the Dawn of the Millennium, 25
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. xiv, xvi n.8 (2002).
65. Indeed, in the seventy-six-year period between 1912 and 1988, notwithstanding
two world wars, one worldwide depression, and countless revolutions and other conflicts
(including the rise and fall of communism in Europe), the international community saw fit
to adopt a dozen multilateral conventions endeavoring to regulate the drug trade. See,
e.g., Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407, 520
U.N.T.S. 204 (entered into force Dec. 13, 1964); Convention on Offenses and Certain
Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219 (entered
into force Dec. 4, 1969); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft,
Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105 (entered into force Oct. 14, 1971);
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation,
Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565 (entered into force Jan. 26, 1973); Protocol Amending the
Single Convention, Mar. 25, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 1439, 976 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Aug.
8, 1975); Convention on Psychotropic Substances, Feb. 2, 1971, 32 U.S.T. 543, 1019
U.N.T.S. 175 (entered into force Aug. 16, 1976); International Convention Against the
Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205, 18 I.L.M. 1456 (entered into force
June 3, 1983); 1988 U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
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anti-drug conventions is the 1988 United Nations Convention
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances, 66 which was an outgrowth of a late 1988 conference in
Vienna 67 and was intended to promote international cooperation in
law enforcement efforts directed against "various aspects of illicit
traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances having an
international dimension." '
Notwithstanding accession to this
treaty, many foreign nations have proved contumacious when it
comes to complying with their legal obligations thereunder.69
"Determined to deprive persons engaged in illicit traffic of
the proceeds of their criminal activities and thereby eliminate their
main incentive for so doing,"70 the signatories to the VNC have
agreed to adhere to a legal structure contemplating enactment by
each of them of comprehensive legislation authorizing confiscation
of drug proceeds or instrumentalities used, intended to be used,
or derived from proscribed narcotics trafficking activities.
Commonly understood, money laundering is a process
whereby criminals conceal or disguise the proceeds of their crimes
or convert those proceeds into goods and services." For purposes
Psychotropic Substances, 28 I.L.M. 493 (1988) (entered into force Nov. 11, 1990)
[hereinafter referred to as the "Vienna Narcotics Convention" or "VNC"]. Whereas the
earlier conventions did not emphasize the criminalization of drugs with tough law
enforcement mechanisms (other than those in aid of administrative regulation established
by those conventions), the VNC did so dramatically and thus represented a sea change in
the international struggle against the drug trade.
66. For an overview of these conventions, see generally Stefan Glaser, Droit P6nal
International Conventionnel 133-39 (1970); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Critical Reflections on
Internationaland National Control of Drugs, 18 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 311, 312-13 & n.
3 (1990); David P. Stewart, Internationalizing the War on Drugs: The UN Convention
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 18 Denv. J. Int'l L. &
Pol'y 387, 388-90 (1990); Vienna Narcotics Convention, supra note 65.
67. For background on this conference, see generally Bruce Zagaris, Developments in
InternationalJudicial Assistance and Related Matters, 18 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 339,
340-41 (1990).
68. Vienna Narcotics Convention, supra note 65, art. 2(1), 28 I.L.M. at 500.
69. See Madelyn J. Daley, Effectiveness of United States and International Efforts to
Combat InternationalMoney Laundering, 2000 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J.
175, 198, note 129, infra.
70. Vienna Narcotics Convention, supra note 65, pmbl., 28 I.L.M. at 498 (emphasis in
original).
71. For purposes of the VNC, "'[p]roceeds' means any property derived from or
obtained, directly or indirectly, through the commission of an offense established in
accordance with article 3, paragraph 1." Id. art. 1(p), 28 I.L.M. at 500.
72. A new and more sinister form of money laundering, known as "reverse money
laundering," involves the movement of legitimate money, unconnected with any prior
criminal activity, through a series of transactions the ultimate purpose of which is to
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of the Vienna Narcotics Convention, money laundering is defined
as:
(i) The conversion or transfer of property,73 knowing that such
property is derived from any offence or offences established in
accordance with subparagraph (a) of this paragraph 74 ... , for
the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the
property or of assisting any person who is involved in the
commission of such an offence or offences to evade the legal
consequences of his actions;
(ii) The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source,
location, disposition, movement, rights with respect to, or
ownership of property, knowing that such property is derived
from an offence or offences established in accordance with
subparagraph (a) of this paragraph .... "
Having defined the nature of the offenses, the VNC requires
its signatories to enact legislation to "identify, trace, and freeze or
seize proceeds, property, instrumentalities or any other Jtainted
Such
assets]... for the purpose of eventual confiscation.
property must be restrained or frozen even before entry of a
Each signatory shall then
domestic order of forfeiture.77
"confiscate"" all forms of property, proceeds, or instrumentalities

finance the commission of a crime or, worse yet, an act of terrorism, all without leaving a
paper trail.
73. For purposes of the VNC, -'[p]roperty' means assets of every kind, whether
corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, tangible or intangible, and legal
Vienna
documents or instruments evidencing title to, or interest in, such assets."
Narcotics Convention, supra note 65, art. l(q), 28 I.L.M. at 500.
74. Said subparagraph (a) requires each signatory to criminalize a laundry list of
offenses relating to narcotics trafficking, including the production, manufacture,
distribution, cultivation, possession, or purchase of any narcotic drug or psychotropic
substance, the manufacture, transportation, or distribution of any equipment, materials, or
substances knowing that they are to be used to manufacture illicit drugs, and the
organization, management, or financing of any such drug offenses. Id. art. 3(1)(a)(i)-(v),
28 I.L.M. at 500-01.
75. Id. art. 3(1)(b)(i)-(ii), 28 I.L.M. at 501. Failure to enact domestic legislation
criminalizing efforts aimed at concealing or disguising the illicit source of drug and money
laundering proceeds constitutes non-compliance under the VNC. Id. art. 5, 28 I.L.M. at
504.
76. Id. art. 5(2), 28 I.L.M. at 504.
77. Id.
78. "Confiscation" for this purpose is defined to include freezing, seizure, and
forfeiture of assets. Compare id. at art. I(f), 28 I.L.M. at 499 ("'Confiscation' . . . including
forfeiture where applicable, means the permanent deprivation of property by order of a
court or other competent authority.") with id. at art. 1(1). 28 I.L.M. at 500 ("'Freezing' or
'seizure' means temporarily prohibiting the transfer, conversion, disposition or movement
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utilized in or derived from said offenses by enactment of
appropriate municipal laws,79 subject only to protection of
innocent, bona fide third parties. 0 This is so even if proceeds of
the unlawful activity have been converted into other property 8l or
intermingled with legitimate money or property, 2 and forfeiture is
also to be imposed upon after-acquired property derived from (or
from income or other benefits arising from) any of the foregoing. 3
No bank secrecy laws enacted by any signatory will excuse its
failure to comply with these requirements.
In order to prevent forfeitable property from being
expatriated out of the reach of law enforcement, restraint and
freezing of tainted assets should also be done for the benefit of any
other signatory having jurisdiction over an offense established
pursuant to the VNC. Specifically, with respect to any such
offense, each signatory is to afford every other signatory "the
widest measure of mutual legal assistance in investigations,
prosecutions and judicial proceedings. 8 6 This includes obtaining
an order of confiscation for the other party's benefit with respect
to forfeitable property within a signatory's jurisdiction, 87 or, in the
alternative, enforcing the other party's order of forfeiture with
respect thereto.88
The same year that the VNC was negotiated, the Basel
Committee on Banking Regulation and Supervisory Practices, a
group formed under the auspices of the Bank for International
Settlements in Basel, Switzerland and originally comprising bank
89
regulators and central bank representatives of the Group of Ten
of property or temporarily assuming custody or control of property on the basis of an
order issued by a court or a competent authority.").
79. Id. art. 5(1), 28 J.L.M. at 504.
80. Id. art. 5(8), 28 I.L.M. at 507.
81. Id. art. 5(6)(a), 28 I.L.M. at 506.
82. Id. art. 5(6)(b), 28 I.L.M. at 506.
83. Id. art. 5(6)(c), 28 I.L.M. at 506.
84. Id. art. 5(3), 28 I.L.M. at 505.
85. Id. art. 5(4)(b), 28 I.L.M. at 505.
86. Id. art. 7(1), 28 I.L.M. at 508.
87. Id. art. 5(4)(a)(i), 28 I.L.M. at 505.
88.

Id. art. 5(4)(a)(ii), 28 I.L.M. at 505.

89. The Basel Committee is best known for its development, during the 1980s, of
international standards setting forth "the details of the agreed framework for measuring
capital adequacy and the minimum standard to be achieved which the national supervisory
authorities represented on the Committee intend to implement in their respective
countries."
BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, FINAL REPORT FOR
INTERNATIONAL

CONVERGENCE

OF

CAPITAL

MEASUREMENT

AND

CAPITAL
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countries, 90 adopted its own Statement of Principles regarding
money laundering.9 Prompted by concerns that adverse publicity
flowing from the association (witting or unwitting, voluntary or
involuntary) of banking organizations with criminal elements
would erode public confidence in and the stability of the banking
system, these Basel "Principles" do not have the force of treaty or,
indeed, any other legally binding character with respect to the
member countries, and are largely aspirational in nature. 92
Furthermore, they are directed at banking institutions within the
member countries only. Nonetheless, they introduced "KYC"
standards intended to discourage banks from doing business with a
customer who prefers to remain anonymous. These standards also
encourage banks, if it should come to their attention that funds on
deposit are the proceeds of illicit activity, to refuse to continue
serving that customer and possibly, in addition to closing the
account, freezing the funds within."

STANDARDS, reprinted in 4 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) at 47-105 (Mar. 15, 1996). For
discussion of how these standards were implemented in U.S. law, see KEITH R. FISHER,
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS OF BANKS AND SAVINGS INSTITUTIONS § 3.16 (1993). For

discussion of the Basel framework and of recently proposed revisions thereto, see Michael
P. Malloy, Capital Adequacy and Regulatory Objectives, 25 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.
REV. 299 (2002).
90. To wit: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,
Sweden. the United Kingdom, and the United States, with additional participation from
Switzerland (ab initio) and later from Luxembourg.
91. COMMITTEE ON BANKING REGULATION AND SUPERVISORY PRACTICES,
BASLE, SWITZERLAND, PREVENTION OF CRIMINAL USE OF THE BANKING SYSTEM FOR
THE PURPOSE OF MONEY LAUNDERING, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES (1988) available at

http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
92. Even so, the Basle Statement of Principles has occasionally been made indirectly
binding by references in national legislation or by carrot and stick approaches wielded by
bank regulators. The Bank of England, for example, is said to factor in compliance with
these Principles when deciding on the extension of bank licenses, see John Drage,
Countering Money Laundering. The Response of the Financial Sector, in MONEY
LAUNDERING 62 (Hume Papers on Public Policy, vol. 1, no. 2, 1993), and the USA
PATRIOT Act amended the Bank Holding Company Act to require the Federal Reserve
Board, in connection with any application by a bank holding company to acquire a bank or

merge with another bank holding company, to consider (in addition to the financial,
managerial, competitive, and community needs factors already statutorily ordained, see
FISHER, supra note 89, §§ 3.2, 3.9-.19) the applicant's "effectiveness in combating money
laundering activities, including in overseas branches." USA PATRIOT Act, supra note
50, § 327 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(6)). A coordinate amendment was also made to
the Bank Merger Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(11).
93. See generally Ronald K. Noble & Court E. Golumbic, A New Anti-Crime
Framework for the World: Merging the Objective and Subjective Models for Fighting
Money Laundering, 30 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 79,116 (1997-98).
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The following year saw the formation of what has become one
of the most influential international bodies dedicated to combating
global money laundering, the Financial Action Task Force on
Money Laundering (the "FATF"). Established by the G-7
Summit held in Paris in 1989, 94 the FATF is charged with analyzing
and keeping abreast of money laundering trends 95 and has
improved on the Basel approach by promulgating a list of forty
recommendations 96 that are updated regularly and that constitute a
transnational framework for combating money laundering (and,
since October 2001, combating financing of terrorism as well).97
Each of the twenty-nine member nations' furnishes information
annually on the status of its domestic implementation of the 40
Recommendations and submits to on-site assessments by the
FATF.99 This regime, like the Basel Statement of Principles, is not
legally binding but operates instead by a process of peer pressure
and moral suasion, which has proved to be reasonably efficacious

94. Group of Seven Economic Declaration of July 16, 1989, reprintedin WILLIAM C.
GILMORE (ED.), INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO COMBAT MONEY LAUNDERING 3 (1992).
The "G-7" countries are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom,

and the United States.

DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL, FISCAL AND ENTERPRISE
AFFAIRS, ORGANIZATION
FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING REPORT, Introduction

(1990).
95.

FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING - FATF, available at

http://wwwl.oecd.org/fatf/pdf/brochure-2000_en.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
96. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, THE FORTY
RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY
LAUNDERING, available at http://wwwl.oecd.org/fatf/40Recs-en.htm (last visited Sept. 21,

2003).

97. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, TERRORIST
FINANCING, available at http://wwwl.oecd.org/fatf/TerFinance-en.htm (last visited Sept.
21,2003).
98. Two international organizations, the European Commission, and the Gulf
Cooperation Council, are also members, and the International Monetary Fund is an
observer. See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, MEMBERS
AND OBSERVERS, available at http://wwwl.oecd.org/fatf/Membersen.htm (last visited
Sept. 21, 2003). For discussion of the membership and functions of the FATF, see
WILLIAM C. GILMORE, DIRTY MONEY: THE EVOLUTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING

COUNTERMEASURES 93-98 (1995). The author of this book, Mr. Gilmore, is the former
head of Britain's National Crime Information Service. See Noble & Golumbic, supra note
93, at 88, n.18.
99. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, MONITORING THE
IMPLEMENTATION
OF
THE
FORTY
RECOMMENDATIONS,
available
at
http://wwwl.oecd.org/fatf/AboutFATF-en.htm#Monitoring (last visited Sept. 21,2003).
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in terms of
inducing member states to enact implementing
legislation. l°°
Furthermore, the FATF has supported the development of
FATF-like bodies outside the European region, such as the
Caribbean Financial Action Task Force 10 and the Asia/Pacific
Group on Money Laundering. 2 Another notable regional effort,
given the extent of money laundering problems originating in
Latin America, is the Organization of American States' creation of
13
the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD)
and its Model Regulations intended to combat money
laundering.'O"
One year after formation of the FATF, the Council of
Europe 5 adopted an anti-money laundering treaty which, by

100. See, e.g., Noble & Golumbic, supra note 93, at 123. Notwithstanding its voluntary
character, the FATF Forty Recommendations have been characterized as "the single most
comprehensive, significant and forceful international declaration on money laundering."
Stephen Labaton, Group of 7 Asks Money-Laundering Curbs, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1990,
at DI (quoting John Robson, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury), cited in Jeffrey Lowell
Quillen, Note, The InternationalAttack on Money Laundering, European Initiatives, 1991
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 213, 218 n.27.
101. The Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) was formed during the
June 1990 Caribbean Drug Money Laundering Conference. See CARIBBEAN FINANCIAL
ACTION TASK FORCE, OVERVIEW, available at http://www.cfatf.org/eng (last visited Sept.
21,2003); see also Berta Esperanza Hernindez, RIP to IRP - Money Launderingand Drug
Trafficking Controls Score a Knockout Victory Over Bank Secrecy, 18 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 235, 289 (1993); Report of the Caribbean Drug Money Laundering
Conference. reprinted in GILMORE, INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS, supra note 94, at 25. The
CFATF has agreed to follow the FATF's Forty Recommendations, along with additional
recommendations (originally twenty-one in number, nineteen of which were adopted at
the Kingston Ministerial Meeting on Money Laundering, November 5-6, 1992). See
CARIBBEAN

FINANCIAL

ACTION TASK FORCE, RECOMMENDATIONS,

available at

http://www.cfatf.org/eng/recommendations (last visited Sept. 21, 2003); see also Money
Launderers Turning to New Institutions, Task Force Reports, 61 BANKING REP. (BNA) 34,
35 (July 5, 1993).
102. See ASIA/PACIFIC GROUP ON MONEY LAUNDERING, available at
http://wwwl.oecd.org/fatf/Ctry-orgpages/org-apg-en.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
103. Hernindez, supra note 101, at 290. The acronym CICAD is derived from the
Spanish: La Comicion Interamericana Contra El Abuso de las Drogas. Id. at 369.
104. CICAD, MODEL REGULATIONS CONCERNING LAUNDERING OFFENSES
CONNECTED TO ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING, RELATED AND OTHER SERIOUS

OFFENSES (1992, rev. 1997), available at http://www.cicad.oas.org/en/?CICAD%20%20New.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
105. Not to be confused with the Council of the European Union, the Council of
Europe, which was formed in May 1949, is an international organization comprised of
some forty-four member nations, which share a common belief in the rule of law and in
fundamental human rights. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, ABOUT THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE,
available at http://www.coe.intrTE/Com/About-COE/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
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encompassing a wider array of illegal activities giving rise to
money laundering than just narcotics trafficking (i.e., arms
trafficking, terrorist activities, and fraud), is slightly broader in
scope than the Vienna Narcotics Convention. This multilateral
treaty 1°6 requires signatories to enact implementing legislation to
criminalize the laundering of the proceeds of crime and to
confiscate0 7 such proceeds, as well as instrumentalities and
property the value of which corresponds to the proceeds, 8 and
contemplates
mutual legal assistance with respect to
investigations, 09 lifting of bank secrecy,"0 freezing of assets,"' and
the like. Nevertheless, despite the loftiness of the words used, the
Strasbourg Convention suffers from some significant limitations,
chief among which is the reservation of a signatory's right to refuse
cooperation where the action sought would be antithetical to the
basic principles of that country's legal system, ' 12 would prejudice
the sovereignty, security, ordre public or other essential interest,"'
is not justified by the level of importance of the case (in the
refusing state's opinion), 4 relates to a political or fiscal offense, " '
would be contrary to the principle of ne bis in idem,"6 or relates to
106. Council of Europe, Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation
of the Proceeds from Crime, done at Strasbourg Nov. 8, 1990, Europ. T.S. No. 141, 30
I.L.M. 148 (1991) (entered into force Nov. 11, 1990) [hereinafter "Strasbourg
Convention"], available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/enlTreatieslHtml/141.htm
(last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
107. In contrast to the VNC, which allows not just courts but any competent authority
to issue a confiscation order, see supra note 78, the Strasbourg Convention vouchsafes this
power only to judicial organs. Strasbourg Convention, supra note 106. art. 1(d), 30 I.L.M.
at 151 ("'Confiscation' means a penalty or a measure ordered by a court following
proceedings in relation to a criminal offense or criminal offenses resulting in the final
deprivation of property.") (emphasis added).
108. Id. art. 2(1), 30 I.L.M. at 151.
109. Id. art. 7, 30 I.L.M. at 153.
110. Id. art. 4(1), 30 I.L.M. at 151.
111. Id. art. 11(1), 30 I.L.M. at 153.
112. Id. art. 18(1)(a), 30 I.L.M. at 155.
113. Id. art. 18(1)(b), 30 I.L.M. at 155.
114. Id. art. 18(1)(c), 30 I.L.M. at 155.
115. Id. art. 18(1)(d), 30 I.L.M. at 155. The usage of "fiscal" in this Convention as
pertaining to those offenses that are revenue-related strongly supports the contention,
supra at text accompanying notes 16-17, that "fiscal" offenses do not encompass money
laundering. (If they did, then the fiscal exception would swallow the Strasbourg
Convention whole).
116. Id. art. 18(1)(e), 30 I.L.M. at 155. The principle "ne bis in idem" or "non bis in
idem" is the equivalent of the prohibition against double jeopardy, U.S. CONST., amdt. V.

The Latin phrase literally means "not twice for the same thing." See, e.g., E. COBHAM
BREWER,
DICTIONARY
OF
PHRASE
AND
FABLE
(1898),
available at
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something which would not be an offense under the refusing
state's laws if it were committed within its jurisdiction.'
Furthermore, each signatory may, "at the time of signature or
when depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance,
approval or accession, by a declaration addressed to the Secretary
General of the Council of Europe, declare that [the adoption of

confiscation measures pursuant to art. 1(1)] applies only to
offenses or categories of offenses specified in such declaration."' '
Not to be outdone, the European Union itself, thorough its
Council of Ministers, issued its own Directive designed to achieve
many of the same objectives. 9 In addition to criminalizing money
laundering without the limitation of a nexus to narcotics trafficking
and encouraging multinational cooperation and coordination in
investigative and enforcement efforts, the EU Directive takes a
leaf from the Basel Commission's financial institution-oriented
approach and adopts "KYC" rules"O and suspicious transaction
reporting requirements.12

Once again, however, there are some obvious shortcomings.
One is the relatively high transaction reporting floor of E15,000.122
Another is that the EU Directive does not mandate the
criminalization of money laundering by domestic legislation.1 23 A
third is an exemption from KYC rules for bank-to-bank
transfers, 24 thereby facilitating money laundering using
correspondent banking relationships with banks in bank secrecy

http://www.bartleby.com/81/12159.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2003); see also EXPRESSIONS
JURIDIQUE NON BIS IN IDEM, available at http://www.locutio.com/expressions-juridiques/
exprjurid-non-bis.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2003) ("En droit penal: formule latine qui
exprime le principe selon lequel une personne d(jA jug6e pour un fait d~lictueux, ne peut
tre poursuivi Anouveau pour le m~me fait.").
117. Strasbourg Convention, supra note 106, art. 18(1)(f), 30 I.L.M. at 155. "[Tihis
ground for refusal applies to cooperation ... only in so far as the assistance sought
involves coercive action." Id.
118. Id. art. 1(2), 30 I.L.M. at 151.
119. Council Directive on Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the
Purpose of Money Laundering (91/308/EEC), 1991 O.J. (L166) 77 [hereinafter "EU
Directive"].
120. Id. art. 3(2), applicable to any transaction (or series of structured transactions) in
excess of 15,000 ECU.
121. Id. art. 3(6).
122. Originally 15,000 ECU, see supra note 120, but the European currency unit
converted to the Euro on January 1, 1999.
123. See Lisa A. Barbot, Comment, Money Laundering:An International Challenge, 3
TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 161,181 (1995).

124. Supra note 119, art. 3(7).
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havens or other jurisdictions with lax (or nonexistent) anti-money

laundering laws.
In addition to multilateral approaches, there are also
numerous bilateral treaties creating regimes of mutual cooperation
in the investigation and prosecution of transnational crime. These
are known as Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs)125 and
create individual frameworks for bilateral cooperation not only in
obtaining and preserving evidence but also in providing assistance
to
facilitate
confiscation
of
criminal
proceeds
and
instrumentalities.1 16 The weakness of these MLATs lies not in

concept but in drafting details. Rather than imposing obligations
with some specificity, along the lines of the VNC, the language
negotiated is often little more than hortatory, and often key
ingredients such as asset forfeiture and freeze orders are missing
from individual MLAT recipes."' Even the multilateral InterAmerican species of MLAT suffers from these same defects.
Both the Vienna Narcotics Convention and the Strasbourg
Convention fostered a trend toward tougher international law
enforcement,1 9 as a number of European countries strengthened
125. See Jimmy Gurule, The 1988 U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances-A Ten Year Perspective: Is InternationalCooperation
Merely Illusory?, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 74, 89-90 (1998).
126. Id. at 90-91 & n.55 (demonstrating that the United States has entered into
numerous such treaties, including MLATs with the likes of Colombia, Mexico, the
Cayman Islands, Thailand, Panama, Switzerland, and others).
127. Id. at 93; see, e.g., Treaty Between the United States and Barbados on Mutual
Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Feb. 28, 1996, U.S.-Barb., S. Treaty Doc. No. 10520, art. 16 (1996).
128. See Inter-American Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Jan.
10, 1995, S. Treaty Doc. No. 104-35, art. 15 (1995) (requiring the parties to "assist each
other, to the extent permitted by their respective laws, in precautionary measures for
securing the proceeds, fruits, and instrumentalities of the crime").
129. The trend is far from uniform, however, and equally far from positive. After
more than a decade had elapsed since the Vienna Narcotics Convention entered into
force, a number of narcotics-producing nations that were nonetheless signatories to the
VNC-countries such as Afghanistan, Algeria, Cuba, Guatemala, Iran, Pakistan, and
Uruguay-had not yet ratified the convention with domestic legislation. See Daley, supra
note 69. For information on all treaty participants, see United Nations Convention against
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Participants, available at
http://www.incb.org/e/conv/1988/resol.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2003). More dismaying
yet, with respect to some major narcotics-producing countries that have already ratified
the VNC, one distinguished commentator (now the Treasury Department's
Undersecretary for Enforcement) has reported that no steps have been taken toward
compliance with the treaty's mandate for enactment of municipal anti-money laundering
legislation. See Gurule, supra note 125, at 86 (citing El Salvador, Haiti, and India). Even
those that have complied with the mandate and enacted the requisite anti-money
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their laws with respect to confiscation of the proceeds of crime
(principally drug trafficking), including Belgium,3 ° Luxembourg, 3'
The United
the Netherlands, 32 Switzerland, 33 and the U.K.3

States, as noted previously, had already taken some steps in this
direction, up to and including the MLCA,"3 ' and additional
legislation was enacted shortly thereafter up through and including
the Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1992.136
In concept, confiscation is quintessentially an in rem
proceeding, which can be civil or criminal (and if civil can even be
prosecuted by an administrative agency), and which, unlike in
personam procedures, can dispense with the requirement of
criminally convicting a suspect and the higher standard of proof
attendant upon such an effort. Another obvious advantage is that
forfeiture proceedings are possible even when the criminal
defendant is unavailable for prosecution.
Such an approach has a long pedigree in the U.S. legal
system'37 and is more common there than elsewhere. The U.S.
Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of
forfeiture actions," 8 though it has required that forfeitures be
proportionate to the gravity of the criminal offense. 39 1
Both the VNC' and the Strasbourg Convention 4' mandate
that signatories implement procedures through domestic
legislation for confiscation of property. Neither convention,

laundering legislation have made scant (if any) efforts at enforcement. Id. at 86 (citing
such mega-exporters of narcotics as Colombia, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Mexico, Nigeria,
Paraguay, and the Dominican Republic).
130. Act of July 17, 1990, amending arts. 42, 43 & 505 of the Belgian Criminal Code.
131. Act of June 13, 1994, amending arts. 31-32 of the Luxembourg Criminal Code.
132. Act of Dec. 10, 1992, amending art. 36e of the Dutch Criminal Code.
133. Act of Mar. 14, 1994, amending arts. 58-59 of the Swiss Criminal Code.
134. Drug Trafficking Act, 1994, c. 37, 54(1) (Eng.) (superseding the Drug Trafficking
Offenses Act, 1986).
135. See MLCA, supra note 38.
136. See Annunzio-Wylie, supra note 46.
137. See, e.g., United States v. Various Items of Personal Property, 82 U.S. 577, 581
(1872) ("It is the property which is proceeded against and, by resort to a legal fiction, held
guilty and condemned as though it were conscious instead of inanimate and insentient.").
138. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974); J.W.
Goldsmith, Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921).
139. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998) (stating that gross
disproportionality standard necessary to pass constitutional muster under the Eighth
Amendment).
140. Vienna Narcotics Convention, supra note 65, art. 5(1)(a), 28 I.L.M. at 504.
141. Strasbourg Convention, supra note 106, art. 2(1), 30 I.L.M. at 151.
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however, distinguishes between two different approaches to
confiscation- (A) property or object confiscation and (B) value
confiscation 142-but contemplate that both models may be used, as
do the majority of FATF member nations 143 (with the express
encouragement of the FATF itself).' 44 The distinction lies in the
forfeiture to the state of the precise property in question versus the
confiscation of a sum certain related to the value of said property.
Forfeiture of title to the precise property is so common with
respect to instrumentalitiesof crime as to need no elaboration but
raises interesting issues with respect to property representing
proceeds of crime. Suppose, for example, that the criminal has,
prior to arrest, already spent or otherwise alienated the proceeds.
He then has enjoyed the benefits of the criminal conduct without
having to worry about confiscation when caught, 14' by no means an
uncommon scenario in the criminal world. In this situation, the
goal of effective deprivation of the fruits of criminal activity would
clearly be frustrated.
Another potentially thorny issue involves the treatment of
innocent third party holders. This has been often encountered
under U.S. law, which operates under a statutorily created 146 legal
fiction, known as the "relation-back" doctrine, declaring that title
to the property is automatically conferred upon the state at the
instant the crime is committed. Consequently, any transfer of the
property or proceeds thereof to a third party would theoretically
be void as a matter of law. Nonetheless, the U.S. Supreme Court
has required that the government obtain a judgment of forfeiture
before such a retroactive transfer of title is effective, the upshot
being that until such a judgment of forfeiture is obtained, an
innocent third party purchaser may invoke a "holder-in-due-

142. See Barry Kellman & David S. Gualtieri, Barricading the Nuclear Window-A
Legal Regime to Curtail Nuclear Smuggling, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 667, 730, n.254.
143. See, e.g., FATF, EVALUATION OF LAWS AND SYSTEMS IN FATF MEMBERS
DEALING WITH ASSET CONFISCATION AND PROVISIONAL MEASURES 2, available at

http://wwwl.oecd.org/fatf/pdf/CONFISC-en.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
144. See, e.g., CARIBBEAN FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, RECOMMENDATION 8,
availableat http://www.cfatf.org/eng (last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
145. See United States v. Ginsburg, 773 F.2d 789, 802 (7th Cir. 1985) ("A racketeer

who dissipates the profits... on wine, women and song has profited from organized crime
to the same extent as if he had put the money in his bank account.").
146. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 853(c), 881(h).

2003]

In Rem Alternatives to Extradition

course"-like defense,' 47 assuming, of course, that the statute
contemplates the availability of such a defense.
Similarly, neither the Vienna Narcotics Convention nor the
Strasbourg Convention forbids the forfeiture of property in the
hands of innocent third parties, though each addresses the rights of
such individuals. 48 For example, rights of third parties that are
affected by a judicial decision of a signatory to the Strasbourg
Convention are taken into account, and such decisions must be
recognized unless the third parties did not have adequate
opportunity to participate in the proceeding, the decision is
incompatible with one already taken in the country requesting
confiscation, or the decision is incompatible with the ordre public
Many municipal laws, as
of the country receiving the request.
well as the U.N. Model money laundering law, that endeavor to
protect the rights of innocent third parties15° may be well
motivated, but from an enforcement perspective they may at times

147. United States v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue, Rumsom, N.J., 507 U.S. 111, 125-29
(1993).
148. Vienna Narcotics Convention, supra note 65, art. 5(8), 28 I.L.M. at 507;
Strasbourg Convention, supra note 106, arts. 5, 21-22; 30 I.L.M. at 152, 157.
149. Id. art. 22. Though beyond the scope of this article, obviously there are
substantial international human rights issues lurking in respect of the rights of third parties
to property subject to confiscation orders, such as participation/due process/fair trial rights
of the sort implicated in, e.g., article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. Interestingly,
however, the European Court of Human Rights has found in rem confiscation procedures
fully consistent with those rights. See, e.g., Allegemeine-Gold-und-Silberscheideanstalt
(AGOSI) v. U.K., 108 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) at 20-21 (1987) (upholding seizure by U.K.
customs of Krugerrands illegally smuggled into Britain, where U.K. authorities had given
AGOSI a fair opportunity to be heard); Air Canada v. U.K., 316 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), 20
E.H.R.R. 150 (1995) (concurring with English court's upholding of U.K. customs seizure
of an Air Canada aircraft after discovery of cannabis resin in cargo container: seizure was
an in rem procedure, not an in personam procedure, and thus presented no requirement
that mens rea of the airline be established). For more on this and related subjects, see
Sanja Djajic, The Right to Property and the Vasilescu v. Romania case, 27 SYRACUSE J.
INT'L L. & COM. 363, 385-86 (2000); Erik Drewniak, Comment, The Bosphorus Case: The
Balancing of Property Rights in the European Community and the Public Interest in
Ending the War in Bosnia, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1007, 1037-39 (1997) (discussing Air
Canada case); Jean M. Sera, Note, The Case for Accession by the European Union to the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, 14 B.U. INT'L L.J. 151, 166
(1996) (discussing A GOSI case).
150. E.g., Swiss Crim. Code art. 59(1); Dutch Crim. Code art. 32(2); UNITED NATIONS
OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL
PROGRAMME, MODEL MONEY LAUNDERING, PROCEEDS OF CRIME AND TERRORIST

FINANCING BILL art. 29, available at http://www.imolin.org/poctf03.htm#_Toc49659151
(last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
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make it too easy for a criminal to transfer proceeds offshore,
through dummy corporations or nominees or otherwise,"' so that
they are no longer, as a technical matter, susceptible to forfeiture.
U.S. criminal forfeiture laws render any transaction
transferring criminal proceeds to a third party void unless the third
party is a bona fide purchaser. Thus if the money is used to buy an
automobile, the car dealer presumably gets to keep the money, but
if it is given to a family member or business or domestic partner, it
is forfeit.152 Practical issues remain, of course, where the third
party has already spent the money or where, for whatever reason,
the government just can't find it. Still, domestic law has helped a
little, as in the case of a professional advisor like a lawyer claiming
to be an innocent third party purchaser. In one case, where the
lawyer lost that argument in court but then claimed he had already
spent the money, the government was permitted to sue him for
conversion of government property. 153
B. Value Confiscation:An Alternative In Rem Approach
As an alternative to object confiscation, value confiscation
offers several advantages. For one thing, it is not restricted to
property constituting proceeds of the crime but can be applied to
property that has, in fact, been lawfully acquired. The question
then is whether there need be some nexus between such lawfully
acquired property and the criminal conduct giving rise to the order
of confiscation. In theory, none ought to be required, but some
approaches limit the confiscation of lawfully acquired property to
circumstances where it has been commingled with the proceeds of
the crime.1 4 Another advantage of value confiscation is that it

151. In this regard, the proliferation of generic international business corporations
(IBCs) is a huge problem. An IBC is simply a corporate vehicle that does not do business
in the country under whose laws it is organized (typically an offshore haven, such as
Antigua) and that can, under those laws, be owned anonymously, e.g., by the use of bearer
shares and nominee directors. The IBC can then be used to open bank accounts so as to
shield from bank records the identity of the true owner of the funds. See generally
LILLEY, supra note 7, at 91; see also id. at 32 (asserting the existence of more than one
million such IBCs).
152. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(c).
153. See United States v. Moffitt, Zwerling & Kemler PC, 83 F.3d 660 (4th Cir. 1996).
154. See, e.g., Vienna Narcotics Convention, supra note 65, art. 5(6)(b), 28 I.L.M. at
506.
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avoids problems of the same proceeds being confiscated more than
once (contrary to the principle non bis in idem).'55
Where the actual proceeds of the criminal conduct have been
transferred (or laundered) to another jurisdiction, but other assets
traceable to the perpetrator remain within the reach of law
enforcement, value confiscation becomes a highly useful tool. A
value confiscation order can be simply a court order requiring the
payment of a monetary amount equivalent in value to the
proceeds of the crime. Indeed, some countries, like6 the U.K., have
adopted value confiscation as the default method.1
In some respects, such an approach resembles a garden
variety criminal fine, but the resemblance is superficial. Fines are
subject to statutory ceilings that often have nothing to do with the
value of the criminal proceeds; fines may also be influenced by
prudential factors relating to the gravity of the offense and the
perpetrator's financial condition, prior record, and miscellaneous
personal circumstances. Value confiscation relates solely to the
monetary value of the proceeds.
In sharp contrast to object confiscation, which is clearly in
rem, value confiscation constitutes either a quasi in rem, or
perhaps even an in personam, approach. The property or proceeds
subject to attachment or forfeiture must be owned by the
perpetrator of the criminal conduct, thereby eliminating any
possible complications regarding the rights of innocent third party
owners. This clean separation is double-edged, of course, in that a
timely wholesale transfer of assets to third parties (who may be
confederates, family members, dummy corporations, and the like)
could defeat the confiscation and the law enforcement objective,
though with sufficient evidence a prosecutor could simply indict
such complicit third parties on substantive money laundering
counts.
Both the VNC and the Strasbourg Convention give the
confiscating state carte blanche with respect to disposition of the
forfeiture proceeds." 7 The state may simply keep the funds or it
may earmark them, as some countries do, for use by law
enforcement authorities in the fight against money laundering and
155. This, it will be recalled, is a basis for refusal of cooperation under the Strasbourg
Convention. See supra note 116.
156. See, e.g., Drug Trafficking Act 1994, supra note 134, §§ 2-7.
157. Vienna Narcotics Convention, supra note 65, art. 5(5)(a), 28 I.L.M. at 506;
Strasbourg Convention, supra note 106, art. 15, 30 I.L.M. at 155.
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other crimes. The possibility also exists for the state to share the
forfeited proceeds with other states or with inter-governmental
bodies dedicated to combating crime. Such sharing is, in fact,
encouraged-though not required-by certain international
instruments, 158 as well as by the U.N. General Assembly. 9 For
states to share in this manner has been rare, except that some6°
states have, with enactment of appropriate domestic legislation,'
been willing to share with other states that have cooperated in the
proceedings that led to the successful confiscation-a kind of
profit-sharing in a transnational law enforcement joint venture
that is facilitated by both the VNC and the Strasbourg
Convention,
6
as well as by the recommendations of the FATF.1 1
Some commentators, including my colleague Eric Blumenson
and his wife Eva Nilsen, 62 are skeptical of the potentially perverse
incentives under a system where law enforcement agencies can, in
effect, receive a considerable "reward" for their assistance in
maximizing forfeiture income to the state. 163 Nevertheless, on an

158. See, e.g., Vienna Narcotics Convention, supra note 65, art. 5(5)(b), 28 I.L.M. at
506; INTER-AMERICAN DRUG ABUSE CONTROL COMMISSION, CICAD MODEL
REGULATIONS, art. 7, available at http://www.cicad.oas.org (last visited Sept. 21, 2003);
REPORT OF THE CARIBBEAN
DRUG MONEY LAUNDERING
CONFERENCE,
Recommendation 9 (1990), available at http://www.cfatf.org/eng/recommendations (last
visited Sept. 21, 2003).

159. See, e.g., U.N. Press Release GA/9413 (June 8, 1998).
160. The United States, given its high-profile anti-money laundering and War on

Drugs initiatives, has been in the forefront of this practice. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 981(i)(1)
(authorizing the Attorney General or the Secretary of the Treasury, under appropriate
circumstances, to transfer forfeited property or the proceeds thereof to any foreign nation
that directly or indirectly participated in the confiscation); 1616a(c)(2) (simile, with respect
to property seized by the Customs Service); 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(1)(E) (simile, with specific
reference to drug-related property).
161. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, THE FORTY
RECOMMENDATIONS,
Recommendations
38-39,
available
at
http://wwwl.oecd.org/fatf/40Recsen.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2003); see also FINANCIAL
ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, EVALUATION OF LAWS AND SYSTEMS
IN FATF MEMBERS DEALING WITH ASSET CONFISCATION AND PROVISIONAL
MEASURES T 37 (detailing sixteen FATF member states that have enacted legislation
authorizing
the
sharing
of
confiscated
assets),
available
at
http://wwwl.oecd.org/fatf/pdf/CONFISC-en.pdf (last visited Sept. 21,2003).
162. See Eric Blumenson and Eva Nilsen, Policingfor Profit: The Drug War's Hidden
Economic Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 51-83 (1998). This Article, it should be
clarified, considers only sharing of forfeited assets under U.S. law and among U.S. law
enforcement agencies, not sharing such assets transnationally further to treaty obligations.
163. See also Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 629 (1989) (noting the
questionable nature of the legitimacy of the government's interest in using the profits of

crime to fund law enforcement activities).
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international level, the imprimatura of the two major conventions,
of the FATF, and even of the U.N. General Assembly suggest that
sharing of forfeited assets, whatever its potential moral
shortcomings, has a firm legal foundation and is, moreover,
regarded as an indispensable tool in the struggle against organized
crime.
III. SHORING UP OBVIOUS WEAKNESSES
Given the merely modest success that has favored frequently
herculean law-enforcement efforts to combat international money
laundering, one is chary of offering suggestions toward solving this
monumental and seemingly intractable problem. Nevertheless,
attention to a number of glaring weaknesses in both international
and U.S. domestic anti-money laundering approaches may yield
perceptible law enforcement gains. Indeed, virtually any positive
suggestion at all is an improvement over the disingenuous handwringing that all too often serves as a substitute for legal analysis,
creative thinking, and political will in the struggle against money
laundering.
A. Targeting InternationalWeaknesses
Effective enforcement of legal obligations is, of course, the
bane of public international law. If anything could be used to
characterize international anti-money laundering regulation (or
even international legal regimes in general), it would be too much
"carrot" and not enough "stick." Widely hailed as the most
effective of the extant approaches, the FATF operates on the basis
of moral suasion-in effect, using a published list of noncomplying
countries as a means to "shame" them into compliance.
This approach will often be effective, but only as a type of
self-fulfilling prophecy. That is, those countries for which moral
suasion will be effective tend to be those that were predisposed
towards compliance in the first place. For those which, in contrast,
are predisposed (or find it to be in their economic self-interest) to
be recalcitrant, generally no amount of suasion or "shaming" will
suffice.
As the increase in volume of laundered funds amply
demonstrates, passive regimes relying on the force of moral
suasion have not stemmed the rising tide of money laundering. If
the international community is truly serious about making
concerted efforts to criminalize money laundering and deter it
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through the aggressive use of confiscation, then the cooperation of
bank secrecy jurisdictions, tax havens, and other recalcitrant
parties must be secured by more aggressive techniques. Clearly,
cooperation from these jurisdictions will be effected only when it is
in their economic self-interest to cooperate. Therefore, the "stick"
of economic sanctions suggests itself as the most promising
approach.
In the first place, more aggressive use can be made of the
mechanism already built into the VNC for signatories not in
compliance with its provisions.
In addition to a provision
encouraging dispute settlement by "negotiation, inquiry,
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, recourse to regional bodies,
judicial process or other peaceful means of [the parties'] own
choice,"' the mandatory jurisdiction16 1 of the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) can sometimes be invoked.'6 If such a case is
successfully prosecuted in the ICJ against a contumacious
signatory to the VNC, failure of that party to abide by the Court's
judgment
• 161 allows the prevailing party recourse to the Security
Council, including requests for imposition of economic sanctions.
ICJ jurisdiction under the Strasbourg Convention is not
mandatory but permissive. That treaty provides for dispute
resolution in the first instance by settlement through negotiation
or any other means of the parties' device, "including submission of
the dispute to the European Commission on Crime Problems, to
an arbitral tribunal whose decisions shall be binding upon the
Parties, or to the International Court of Justice, as agreed upon by
the Partiesconcerned.' 168
Given VNC and Strasbourg Convention signatories' ability to
avoid mandatory ICJ jurisdiction, and in view of the dire

164. Vienna Narcotics Convention, supra note 65, art. 32(1).
165. Article 36(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides for
jurisdiction over matters "specifically provided for in... treaties and conventions in
force."
166. Vienna Narcotics Convention, supra note 65, art. 32(2).
This invocation
presupposes not only the failure of the settlement approaches identified in art. 32(1) but
also that the party against whom enforcement is sought has not, in its accession to the
VNC, declared that it is not agreeing to be bound by mandatory ICJ jurisdiction under
Article 32(2). Vienna Narcotics Convention, supra note 65, art. 32(4).
167. See U.N. Charter art. 94(2).
168. Strasbourg Convention, supra note 106, art. 42(2), 30 I.L.M. at 163 (emphasis
added). Of course, in a permissive jurisdiction regime such as this, no specific reservation
procedure on their part comparable to VNC art. 32(4) is necessary. See supra note 166.
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macroeconomic consequences of money laundering 169 and the use
of laundered funds (as well as legitimate funds, in so-called
"reverse money laundering") to further, among other things, arms
trafficking and terrorism,70 sufficient grounds arguably exist to
apprehend a threat to international peace and security, thereby
justifying a more direct approach to invocation by the Security
Council of its power to impose economic sanctions." As is well
known, the Security Council has used its authority under Article
41 to impose economic sanctions against South Africa and
Rhodesia to achieve human rights goals,'73 against Iraq as a
punitive measure resulting from its invasion of Kuwait, and
as a reprisal against various
against Serbia and Montenegro,
75
acts.1
Serbian
condemned
An alternative, and possibly more productive approach in the
long run, would be to amend both the Vienna Narcotics
Convention and the Strasbourg Convention to include explicit
provisions for sanctions in the event of noncompliance with treaty
obligations. This might, of course, lead to denunciation or
withdrawal from the treaties by some of the most notoriously

169. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.

170. See, e.g.,

FINANCIAL

ACTION

TASK FORCE ON

MONEY LAUNDERING,

GUIDANCE FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN DETECTING TERRORIST FINANCING 11

15-18 (2002), available at http://wwwl.oecd.org/fatf/pdf/GuidFITF01_en.pdf (last visited
Sept. 21, 2003).
171. See U.N. Charter, art. 39. Current events, including the suicide bomber terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, the proliferation of fanatical suicide bombers in Israel, and
the possession by rogue states (e.g., North Korea, Iraq) of weapons of mass destruction all
amply support this contention.
172. U.N. Charter, art. 41. As recognized by the Secretary-General, economic
sanctions are an important tool, enabling the Security Council to exert pressure without
recourse to force. See Report of the Secretary-Generalon the Work of the Organization,
U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., Supp. No. 1, P89, U.N. Doc. A/52/1 (1997); see also W. Michael
Reisman & Douglas L. Stevick, The Applicability of InternationalLaw Standardsto United
Nations Economic Sanctions Programmes,9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 86, 90 (1998) (explaining that
sanctions are an instrument of strategy designed to change the attitudes and behavior of
the target).
173. See e.g., S.C. Res. 181, U.N. SCOR, 18th Sess. 1056th mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/181 (1963) (South Africa); S.C. Res. 221, U.N. SCOR, 21st Sess., 1277th mtg. at 5,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/221 (1966) (Rhodesia); S.C. Res. 232, U.N. SCOR 21st Sess., 1340th
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/232 (1966) (Rhodesia).
174. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2933d mtg. at 19, U.N. Doc.
S/INF/46 (1990); S.C. Res. 670, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess. 2943d mtg., U.N. Doc. S[INF/46
(1990).
175. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 757, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3082d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/757
(1992); S.C. Res. 820, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3120th mtg. (1993).
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recalcitrant signatories, but that would scarcely leave the
international community worse off than it is with their continued,
if useless, accession. Then again, political factors might cause the
recalcitrant to reconsider their contumacy and mend their ways.
These factors include not merely the unpalatability of branding
oneself as an outlaw nation that supports international organized
crime, but also the potential for concerted economic action against
such rogue states (either on a regional basis or, with the added
political justification, through the U.N. Security Council, as
aforesaid).
Economic sanctions are no panacea, however. Indeed, there
has been considerable debate about their overall effectiveness."'
Yet, there is evidence that targeted sanctions, such as the
European Union blacklist of Serbian President Slobodan
Milosevic and a variety of asset freezes, have achieved some
measure of success.177
The stick can, of course, be combined with a juicier carrot.
More liberal sharing of forfeiture proceeds among nations that
cooperated in the investigation and recovery of laundered funds
can be a powerful incentive, given the estimated annual volume of
such funds.
Such sharing is expressly contemplated by the
79 and provisions therefore have also been enshrined in U.S.
VNC,1
1 80
law.

Furthermore, there are possibilities for increased multilateral
cooperation in plugging those international trade loopholes that
foster money laundering. As Baker observes:
[A] selection can be made of several hundred documents
covering imports into and exports out of a foreign country.
Prices on these transactions can be checked by negotiating fresh

176. See, e.g., BARRY E. CARTER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 14-24
(1988); GARY E. HUFBAUER, JEFFREY J. SCHOTr & KIMBERLY A. ELLIOTT, ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED 33-42, 92-93 (2d ed. 1990). For a cogent review of the
literature, see MICHAEL P. MALLOY, U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: THEORY & PRACTICE
339-83 (2001).
177. See Gary E. Hufbauer & Barbara Oegg, Targeted Sanctions: A Policy
Alternative?, 32 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 11, 15-18 (2000).

178. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text. Asset sharing "may be among the
most potent inducements to international cooperation and may result in significant
enhancement of law enforcement capabilities in [drug-producing countries and drugtransit countries]." Stewart, supra note 65, at 396.
179. VNC, supra note 65, art. 5(5), 28 I.L.M. at 506.
180. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(i).
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quotations on the same items under the same terms with the
same suppliers, but with different destinations to disguise the
inquiry. This process, and others, can reveal a pattern of
mispricing, and such a pattern can be tested by additional
investigative methods that focus specifically on kickbacks paid
abroad."1
Using data garnered in this fashion with respect to overvalued
Swiss imports and undervalued Swiss exports, one recent study has
measured the effectiveness of Switzerland's anti-money laundering
law on capital flows. 82
'

Clearly then, Baker is quite right that law enforcement can
detect and deter abnormal pricing in international trade
transactions. All that is lacking is the will to devote resources to
do so.
B. Targeting U.S. Domestic Weaknesses

The waging of the United States' so-called War on Drugs, and
the concomitant struggle against money-laundering, has hardly
been a resounding success. Short of actually legalizing narcotics,
which would certainly deprive money laundering of its principal
raison d'etre, the United States must adopt Executive branch
policies that are more far-sighted and legislation that is more
aggressive in order to make a dent in the vast volume of laundered
funds.

181. Baker, supra note 57, at 36. Baker's methodology is aimed at estimating flight
capital, but it works equally well with respect to money laundering. He estimates annual
flight capital from Latin America at $25-30 billion, from Africa at $10-15 billion, from
Russia at $15-25 billion, from other CIS countries (e.g., Ukraine, Belarus, Uzbekistan, and
Kazakstan) at $5-10 billion, the Middle East at $5-10 billion, China at a minimum of $10
billion, and other Asian countries (Indonesia, Pakistan, India, Thailand, and Myanmar:
notably, Baker did not estimate Hong Kong, South Korea, and the Philippines) at $5-10
billion. Id. at 36-37.
182. Maria E. De Boyrie, Simon J. Pak & John S. Zdanowicz, The Impact of
Switzerland's Money Laundering Law on Capital Flows Through Abnormal Pricing in
International Trade, CIBER Working Paper, Center for International Business and
Education Research, Florida International University, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?cfid=534688&cftoken=61702573&Abstractid=268444 (last visited Sept.
21, 2003).
183. The author takes no position herein on this hotly debated topic, which clearly is
well beyond the scope of this article but which has a rich literature of its own. For a small
sampling, see, e.g., James Ostrowski, The Moral and PoliticalCase for Drug Legalization,
18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 607 (1990); Juan R. Torruella, The "War on Drugs": One Judge's
Attempt at a Rational Discussion, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 235 (1997).
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The power of the purse is doubtless one of the most effective
tools of persuasion that the United States has at its disposal vis-avis other nations.
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as

amended,'

links provision of U.S. assistance'8 5 to the recipient

country's cooperation in combating international narcotics
trafficking. 8 6 The Act requires the President to identify "major

drug-producing
countries,"'" 7 "major drug transit
1
countries,"
and "money laundering countries," 9 and then
illicit

mandates the withholding of bilateral and multilateral assistance
to those countries in the first two (but not the third) of such
categories, except where the President makes certain certifications.
Thus, withholding of assistance will not take place where the
President certifies that an identified country has cooperated fully
with the United States (or, in the alternative, has taken adequate
steps on its own to comply with the VNC)' 9 or, in the alternative,

184. Act of Sept. 4, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2151 et seq.).
185. "U.S. assistance" is defined broadly to include sales, or financing on any terms,
under the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2751 et seq.; the provision of agricultural
commodities, other than food, under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance
Act of 1954, 7 U.S.C. § 1691 et seq.; financing under the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945,
12 U.S.C. § 635a et seq.; and any assistance whatsoever under the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961, (including certain Overseas Private Investment Corporation programs under 22
U.S.C. § 2191 et seq.), with the exception of international narcotics control assistance and
various forms of humanitarian assistance (e.g., for disaster relief, refugees, etc.). 22 U.S.C.
§ 2291(e)(4).
186. See 21 U.S.C. § 2291j.
187. This term is defined as including any country in which (A) 1,000 hectares or more
of illicit opium poppy is cultivated or harvested during a year; (B) 1,000 hectares or more
of illicit coca is cultivated or harvested during a year; or (C) 5,000 hectares or more of
illicit cannabis is cultivated or harvested during a year, unless the President determines
that such illicit cannabis production does not significantly affect the United States. 22
U.S.C. § 2291(e)(2).
188. This term is defined as including any country that is a significant direct source of
illicit narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances significantly affecting
the United States or through which such drugs or substances are transported. 22 U.S.C. §
2291(e)(5).
189. These are countries "whose financial institutions engage in currency transactions
involving significant amounts of proceeds from international narcotics trafficking." 22
U.S.C. § 2291(e)(7).
190. 22 U.S.C. § 2291j(b)(1)(A). "Cooperation" for these purposes means that the
President must consider the extent to which a country: (a) met the goals and objectives of
the VNC, including action on such issues as illicit cultivation, production, distribution,
sale, transport and financing, and money laundering, asset seizure, extradition, mutual
legal assistance, law enforcement and transit cooperation, precursor chemical control, and
demand reduction; (b) accomplished the goals described in an applicable bilateral
narcotics agreement with the United States or a multilateral agreement; and (c) took legal
and law enforcement measures to prevent and punish public corruption, especially by
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that the vital national interests of the United States require that
assistance that would otherwise be withheld be provided and that
the United States not vote against multilateral development bank
assistance for that country.
Any identified country not so
certified will lose fifty percent of U.S. bilateral assistance to that
country, and the United States will
also oppose assistance from
"multilateral development banks.' ' 19 2
The first obvious improvement on this scheme would be to
amend the Foreign Assistance Act to treat "money laundering
countries" in pari materia with "major illicit drug-producing
countries" and "major drug transit countries" for purposes of
withholding U.S. assistance. A second (and no less obvious)
improvement would be a more consistent and hard-line approach
to the granting of Presidential "vital national interest"
certifications.
For example, in 1998, former President Clinton determined
that Afghanistan, Iran, and Nigeria were not in compliance with
the goals and objectives of the VNC and hence ineligible for U.S.
assistance, 93 but he simultaneously certified Colombia, Pakistan,
and Paraguay-countries equally not in compliance-as eligible
due to "vital national interests."' 94 While the author was not privy
to the councils of the mighty, it does seem that this disparity was
both ludicrous and short-sighted, the more so when one also
considers that one Clinton Cabinet member said that moneylaundering activities in Russia might jeopardize assistance to that

senior government officials, that facilitates the production, processing, or shipment of
narcotic and psychotropic drugs and other controlled substances, or that discourages the
investigation or prosecution of such acts. 22 U.S.C. § 2291j(b)(2).
191. 22 U.S.C. § 2291j(b)(1)(B). A Presidential certification under this provision must
furnish: (a) a full and complete description of the vital national interests placed at risk if
U.S. bilateral assistance to that country is terminated and multilateral development bank
assistance is not provided; and (b) a statement weighing the above-described risk against
the risks posed to the vital national interests of the United States by the failure of such
country to cooperate fully with the United States in combating narcotics or to take
adequate steps to combat narcotics on its own. 22 U.S.C. § 2291(b)(3).
192. See 22 U.S.C. § 2291j(a)(1)-(2). For this purpose, "multilateral development
bank" means the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the
International Development Association, the Inter-American Development Bank, the
Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank, and the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development. 22 U.S.C. § 2291j(a)(2).
193. See Gurule, supra note 125, at 86-87.
194. Id. at 87-88.

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 25:409

country!1 95 With respect to which of these seven countries, one
wonders rhetorically, would a certification based on the "vital
national interests" of the United States be most appropriate?
On the legislative front, some progress was, in fact, made with
IMLAAFA, 196 though it is scandalous that it took heinous acts of
terrorism and the destruction of the World Trade Center in New
York City to provide Congress with the requisite backbone. Three
examples of the simplicity entailed in making this progressprovisions dealing with correspondent accounts, bulk cash
smuggling, and enforcement of foreign confiscation orders (the
latter actually antedating IMLAAFA by one year)-will serve to
underscore how easily further improvements to the efficacy of law
enforcement could be effected legislatively.
The problem with correspondent accounts was discussed
above,197 and Congress addressed the problem with the creation of
a value confiscation regime for correspondent accounts. Since
IMLAAFA, when law enforcement authorities know that tainted
money has been deposited overseas into an account at a foreign
bank having a U.S. correspondent account, funds in the latter
account in an amount equivalent to the tainted funds on deposit
overseas are subject to immediate forfeiture."" In the ensuing
forfeiture action, the burden is on the foreign depositor-who now
is considered for purposes of U.S. law to be the owner of the
funds-to challenge the forfeiture action in the U.S. courts. No
innocent third party concerns apply here as, if the depositor does
not initiate such a challenge or is unsuccessful in one, the foreign
bank may always recover the funds taken from its correspondent
account by debiting the foreign bank account containing the
tainted funds.
Furthermore, IMLAAFA authorizes U.S. law enforcement
agencies to obtain records from foreign banks regarding
transactions that take place abroad. As a condition of opening a

195.

See Money Laundering Allegations May Affect Food Aid, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 30,

1999, at D1 (quoting former U.S. Agriculture Secretary Dan Glickman). Similar inanity
(though not as to food aid) was expressed by former Republican Congressman and House
Banking Committee Chairman Jim Leach: "We should also emphasize retrieving stolen
assets for the Russian people rather than giving new aid, except perhaps food assistance."
James A. Leach, The New Russian Menace, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1999, at A25.
196. See supra note 72.
197. See notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
198. IMLAAFA, supra note 72, § 319(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 981(k)).
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correspondent account in the United States, foreign banks are now
required to designate a U.S. person authorized to accept a
subpoena for bank records, and both the Attorney General and
the Secretary of the Treasury are authorized to serve that person
with a subpoena for records concerning transactions that took
place in a non-U.S. office of the foreign bank. 9 9 Refusal to comply
with such a subpoena constitutes grounds for closing the
correspondent account.200
The growing problem of bulk cash smuggling was also
addressed-at least partially-in IMLAAFA. The only benefit to
the vast volume of cash generated by street-level drug sales is that
it creates a logistical nightmare for drug dealers. Cash is bulkier,
far heavier, and more difficult to conceal than most drugs, and
hence more susceptible to discovery and confiscation.
Obstacles posed by the BSA and its amendments have
effectively shut down many smurfing and other structuring
operations.
Professional money launderers now endeavor
physically to smuggle cash out of the country, and deposit it into a
foreign bank or sell it on the black market.0 Prior to IMLAAFA,
the only available options for law enforcement were to confiscate
the cash and to prosecute the courier for a customs violation (not
declaring on a customs form the expatriation of more than
$10,000),22 or to confiscate the money on the ground that it
represented the proceeds of a criminal offense 203 and hope to be
able to make the case. The customs violation prosecution-far
from an ideal law enforcement tool-became even less useful
when the Supreme Court decided that outright confiscation of the
smuggled cash is unconstitutional because it is "grossly
disproportional to the gravity of the offense." 204 The option of
trying to prove that the cash was derived from criminal proceeds
can often be successful, particularly given helpful cases allowing
the requisite proof by recourse to positive alerts from dogs trained

199. IMLAAFA, supra note 72, § 319(b) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5318(k)).
200. Id. § 319(b) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5318(k)).
201. See Testimony of Assistant Attorney General James Robinson, House Crime
Subcommittee, Feb. 10, 2000, text available at http://www.house.gov/judiciaryl
robi0210.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
202. See 31 U.S.C. § 5316.
203. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C).
204. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998).
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to detect traces of narcotics20 ' but it allows the courier to go on his

merry way and is no use at all in a reverse money laundering
scenario, where the cash is, by definition, legitimate.
IMLAAFA partially addressed this problem by creating a
new crime of bulk cash smuggling: transporting more than $10,000
into or out of the United States with the intent to evade the
customs laws.' °7 The penalty for the offense includes the
confiscation of the cash.
IMLAAFA does not, however, criminalize transporting cash
in excess of $10,000 solely within the United States itself, even
where the courier knows the cash constitutes proceeds of criminal
activity or, as in reverse money laundering, that it is intended to be
used for an unlawful purpose. The ease with which terrorists can
move cash within the United States to fund and facilitate their
nefarious plots is ample evidence that more ought to be done in
this regard.2°
Finally, notwithstanding the length of time that the VNC and
the Strasbourg Convention have been in force, only recently has
the United States enacted domestic legislation consistent with the
international cooperation regime for confiscation orders
contemplated thereunder. This was accomplished in a provision
enacted as part of the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 ,
which implemented procedures reminiscent of uniform state laws
for enforcement of foreign civil judgments. Under the Uniform
Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act, for example, a
foreign damages judgment will be enforced if it was obtained with
205. See United States v. $22,474 in U.S. Currency, 246 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2001).
206. Cases had established that mere transport of criminal proceeds does not
constitute money laundering. See, e.g., United States v. Puig-Infante, 19 F.3d 929 (5th Cir.
1994).
207. IMLAAFA, supra note 72, § 371 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5332).
208. See, e.g., Barry Flynn, Hijackers Had Cash in Suntrust;An Investigation by the FBI
Showed that the Accounts Were Opened Legally, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 11, 2002, at
Al; James Risen, Traces of Terror; The Money Trail: Money Transfers by Hijackers Did
Not Set Off Alarms for Banking Regulators, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2002, at A16, col. 1; see
also Desmond Butler, Threats and Responses: Intelligence; Germans Were Tracking Sept.
11 Conspiratorsas Early as 1998, Documents Disclose, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2003, at A10,
col. 1 (reporting that Mounir el-Motassadeq, a Moroccan who came to Germany in 1993 to
study engineering, is being prosecuted in Germany for providing logistical support for the
planners of the September 11, 2001 acts of terrorism in the United States, including
transferring money to the hijackers after they moved to the United States for flight
training).
209. Pub. L. No. 106-85, 114 Stat. 202 (2000) [hereinafter referred to as "CAFRA"].
210. See 28 U.S.C. § 2467.
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sufficient indicia of what courts in the United States traditionally
consider due process, i.e., a full and fair opportunity for a hearing,
conducted with regular proceedings before a court of competent
jurisdiction in a nation with an impartial judicial system and in the
absence of any indication of prejudice or fraud.
So too under
CAFRA, where the government is satisfied that the foreign
confiscation order was obtained with sufficient indicia of due
process, it may apply to a federal court for judicial enforcement
thereof.
The fly in the ointment, as originally enacted, was the absence
of any procedure for freezing the assets in the United States while
the foreign authorities obtained their confiscation order,
transmitted it to the United States, and the U.S. authorities took
the requisite steps to enforce it. Given the sophistication of
criminal enterprises engaged in multinational money laundering, it
would be remarkable-to say the least-if the funds sat patiently
awaiting the completion of these formalities.
Once again, IMLAAFA came to the rescue, adding new
language authorizing a federal district court to "preserve the
availability of property subject to a foreign forfeiture or
confiscation judgment" by issuing a restraining order "at any time
before or after" the government receives a final judgment of
forfeiture from the foreign court."
In issuing the restraining
order, the court may either rely on an affidavit "describing the
nature of the proceeding or investigation underway in the foreign
country" and setting forth the basis for the restraint, or "register
and enforce" a foreign court's restraining order.213 Moreover,
duplicative challenges in both jurisdictions are avoided by
statutory language preventing a challenge "on any ground that is
the subject of parallel litigation
involving the same property that is
2 14
court.
foreign
a
in
pending
Many more domestic loopholes for money launderers require
plugging. As Stefan Casella points out, the statutory laundry list of
"specified unlawful activities, 215 that are predicates for money

211. Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Act, 13 U.L.A. 263 (1980). See RALPH H.
FOLSOM, MICHAEL WALLACE GORDON & JOHN A. SPANOGLE, JR., INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 1282-1306 (4th ed. 1999).
212. See IMLAAFA, supra note 72, § 323 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2467(d)(3)).
213. Id. § 323.
214. Id. § 323.
215. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7).
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laundering prosecutions, while extensive (comprising over 200
separate offenses), includes relatively few crimes committed
216
overseas:
The great majority of other foreign crimes-crimes that
routinely generate money that the criminal wants to hide or
invest somewhere else, or that may be used to finance criminal
acts in the United States (such as consumer fraud, theft, and tax
evasion, to mention only a few)-are not on the list, making it
very difficult for a prosecutor to use the money laundering laws
to prevent banks in the United States from being used 217to wash
the proceeds of the crimes committed around the world.
There is no conceivable public policy justification for not
keeping the proceeds of all foreign crimes, not just some, out of
the U.S. financial system. Accomplishing this requires but a
simple, straightforward amendment to the MLCA to make
laundering criminal proceeds a crime regardless of where the
underlying crime was committed.
Casella also identifies a problem involving the ability of the
government to confiscate laundered money when it has been
commingled in bank accounts with non-laundered funds. "The
civil forfeiture laws require that the property being seized be
directly traceable to the property that was generated by the
criminal act.... [It isn't] if the balance... [fluctuated] between the
time of the deposit and the time the government discovered the
money. Placing money in a volatile bank account, in other words,
the link between the initial deposit and the eventual
destroys
•
,,218
seizure.

Another problem is that current forfeiture statutes regard
money as fungible for only one year.219 This creates enormous

practical problems given the length of time required for
As
consummation of a successful undercover investigation.
Casella suggests, "The solution is simple: in money laundering
cases, there should be no limit on how long money is considered

216.

See Stefan Casella, Money Laundering Has Gone Global: It's Time to Update the

Federal Laws, FED. LAW., Jan. 2002, 24, 26 (citing as examples drug trafficking, bank
fraud, public corruption, and crimes of violence). Mr. Casella is assistant chief of the
Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section of the U.S. Department of Justice.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 28 (citing United States v. Banco Cafetero Panama, 797 F.2d 1154 (2d Cir.
1986)).
219. Casella, supra note 216, at 28 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 984).
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fungible. Any other rule only encourages the shell game involving
electronic funds that the money laundering laws were intended to
avoid. ,221
Finally, insufficient attention has been given to the terrorismrelated threats posed by reverse money laundering and Hawala.

While existing law does criminalize the transfer of money across
the U.S. border with the intent to use it in aid of a criminal

offense,22' purely internal money transmission for the same
purpose is not unlawful. Here again, a simple amendment would
provide law enforcement (and the new Department of Homeland
Security)2 2 with valuable tools.

Hawala is a more difficult problem, in that criminalizing that
activity outright would be not only an overbroad response to the
danger posed but also constitutionally problematic. The simple
solution, instead, is to mandate that all money transmission
22 3
businesses be licensed and subjected to comprehensive
examination and supervision by state or federal regulators.
Implementation of such a licensing requirement makes it easy both
to monitor the flow of funds and to criminalize the conduct of any

such business on an unlicensed basis. Once licensed, moreover,
these businesses can readily be made subject to existing currency
reporting and SAR requirements, in pari materia with other
licensed financial intermediaries.

220. Id.
221. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A).
222. Created as an Executive Department by the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002), the Department of Homeland Security is tasked,
inter alia, with the mission of preventing terrorist attacks within the United States and
reducing the country's vulnerability to terrorism. Id. § 101(b)(1)(A)-(B), 116 Stat. at
2142.
223. FinCEN has already promulgated a rule requiring "money service businesses" -a
term broadly defined to include "money transmitters," to file SAR's. See Dep't of the
Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Amendments to the Bank Secrecy Act
Regulations- Requirement that Money Transmitters and Money Order and Traveler's
Check Issuers, Sellers, and Redeemers Report Suspicious Transactions, 65 Fed. Reg.
13,683 (2000) (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 103.20). Even though a hawaladar may technically
fall within the catchall provision of the defined term "money transmitter," see 12 C.F.R. §
103.1 1(uu)(5)(i)(B) (2003), the level of supervision and regulation necessary to accomplish
fundamental regulatory goals is far in excess of a mere SAR obligation, assuming that is
even enforceable against such low-profile operators.
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CONCLUSION

Much of the intractability of money laundering to effective
detection and deterrence is based not on a lack of law enforcement
tools but on their relative lack of efficacy. Confiscation represents
the clearest and best technique -depriving the malefactors of their
While both international and domestic
ill-gotten gains.
frameworks have been created to foster and facilitate law
enforcement authorities' use of this tool, a number of practical
political and legal problems diminish its potency. Potential legal
solutions are fairly straightforward, and some of these are
suggested in this article. All that is required is the political will of
the international community to implement them.

